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EQUALITY AND SUFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE REFORM
GABRIEL SCHEFFLER*
Most Americans believe that health care is a right, not a privilege. Yet
debates over health care reform frequently fail to distinguish between two
distinct conceptions of the right to health care: one which focuses on
sufficient access to health care—what I refer to as the Right to a Decent
Minimum—and a second which focuses on equality in access to health care—
what I refer to as the Right to Equal Access. These two conceptions of the
right to health care in turn support two distinct categories of proposals for
expanding health insurance coverage. The Right to Equal Access justifies a
more radical set of reforms, such as Medicare for All, whereas the Right to
a Decent Minimum justifies a more incremental approach to health care
reform, such as by building on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act. Comparing these two conceptions of the right to health care to Medicare
for All and the incremental reforms clarifies what it as stake in the debate
over health care reform: not just concerns about political feasibility, but also
different moral or political values. At the same time, it reveals that there are
some surprising areas of convergence between these two conceptions of the
right to health care, and accordingly, that there is room for greater
convergence between these two types of reform proposals.
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INTRODUCTION
Most Americans today believe that health care is a right, not a privilege.1
In other words, they believe that all Americans are entitled to have health
care, and that it is the government’s responsibility to ensure that that is the
case.2 Yet the notion that health care is a right lacks specificity: What,
concretely, is the kind of health care to which people have a right?
Viewing health care as a right apparently does not entail support for one
specific health care reform plan.3 Both President Joe Biden and Senator
Bernie Sanders have described health care as a right, yet the latter made a
single-payer Medicare for All plan the centerpiece of his 2016 and 2020
presidential campaigns,4 whereas the former endorsed a more incremental
approach that would expand the coverage provisions in the 2010 Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), lower the eligibility age for
Medicare, and establish a public option.5 More generally, although
Democrats tend to be strongly supportive of the notion that health care is a
right, they have largely clustered into two main camps: those who support
Medicare for All, and those who take a more incremental approach to health
care reform, such as the Biden plan.6 These two camps’ preferred health care
reform proposals differ in various ways, including in terms of the benefits

1. Healthcare System, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4708/healthcare-system.aspx
(last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
2. See Leif Wenar, Rights, in STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. 1, 1 (Edward N. Zalta et al., 2021),
https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/rights/ (defining rights as “entitlements (not) to perform
certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain
actions or (not) be in certain states”).
3. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 8 (1985) [hereinafter DANIELS, JUST HEALTH
CARE] (“Talk about a ‘right to health care’ can . . . imply quite different things, both with regard to
the scope of what is being claimed and with regard to the type of justification it needs.”).
4. Sen. Bernie Sanders, An Economic Agenda for America: 12 Steps Forward, HUFFINGTON
POST: BLOG (Dec. 1, 2014, 12:13 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/an-economic-agenda-foram_b_6249022 (“The United States must join the rest of the industrialized world and recognize that
health care is a right of all, and not a privilege. Despite the fact that more than 40 million Americans
have no health insurance, we spend almost twice as much per capita on health care as any other
nation. We need to establish a Medicare-for-all, single-payer system.”).
5. READ: Joe Biden’s Remarks on Civil Unrest and Nationwide Protests, CNN (June 2, 2020,
12:00 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/02/politics/biden-philadelphia-transcript/index.html
(“[H]ealth care . . . should be a right not a privilege. The quickest route to universal coverage in
this
country
is
to
expand
Obamacare.”);
Health
Care,
BIDEN HARRIS,
https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
6. Abby Goodnough & Trip Gabriel, ‘Medicare for All’ vs. ‘Public Option’: The 2020 Field
Is
Split,
Our
Survey
Shows,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
23,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/us/politics/2020-democrats-medicare-for-all-publicoption.html.
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that they would guarantee, the amount of cost-sharing borne by patients, and
the role played by private insurance.7
Most of the public debate between these different camps has revolved
around two fault lines: political feasibility and economic costs.
Incrementalists object to Medicare for All as politically impossible and
excessively costly.8 Supporters of Medicare for All counter that the
incrementalists are misinterpreting the lessons of history,9 and that Medicare
for All will lower costs by improving administrative efficiencies and
reducing health care prices.10 Which of these positions is correct is an
empirical question. Both sides are making predictions about the future, while
drawing on historical experience, data, and assumptions.11
What is less clear is whether these two positions also reflect different
normative positions regarding the kind of health care benefits to which
people are entitled. Many incrementalists deny that they object to Medicare
for All in principle, but instead claim that they object to it on other grounds,
such as that it is too politically difficult, or that there are other more important
policy priorities (such as reforming our electoral system or addressing
climate change).12 Some health scholars have portrayed the debate between
7. See infra Part I. Of course, a substantial fraction of the American public does not view
health care as a right at all, but rather as a privilege or a market commodity. See Healthcare System,
supra note 1. This Article does not focus on that position, but it has been widely discussed
elsewhere. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? (1997); Atul Gawande, Is Health Care a Right?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/02/is-health-care-a-right.
8. See, e.g., Paul Starr, Rebounding with Medicare: Reform and Counterreform in American
Health Policy, 43 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L., 707, 724 (2018); Emmarie Huetteman, Democrats
Debate Whether ‘Medicare For All’ is ‘Realistic,’ KAISER HEALTH NEWS & POLITFACT
HEALTHCHECK (Dec. 20, 2019), https://khn.org/news/democrats-debate-whether-medicare-for-allis-realistic/.
9. See Adam Gaffney, Medicare For All: If Not Now, When?, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 9,
2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200309.156440/full/.
10. See, e.g., id.; Shefali Luthra, Sanders Embraces New Study That Lowers ‘Medicare For
All’s’ Cost, But Skepticism Abounds, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://khn.org/news/bernie-sanders-embraces-a-new-study-that-lowers-medicare-for-alls-pricetag-but-skepticism-abounds/; Meagan Day & Bhaskar Sunkara, Why America Needs Medicare for
All, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/medicare-for-allhealth-costs.html.
11. See Josh Katz, Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, Would ‘Medicare for All’ Save
Billions
or
Cost
Billions?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/10/upshot/medicare-for-all-bernie-sanders-costestimates.html (cataloging different economists’ and think tanks’ estimates of how Medicare for All
would affect American health care expenditures).
12. See, e.g., Bobby Clark, The Peril of Medicare for All, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191018.763821/full/; John E. McDonough,
Medicare For All: What History Can Teach Us About its Chances, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Feb. 21,
2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200218.541583/full/; Matthew Yglesias,
Democratic Priorities For 2021: What’s Most Important?, VOX (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/26/18027000/democratic-priorities-2021.
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the two camps as one about means rather than ends, and have emphasized
that both sides share the common goal of achieving universal health
insurance coverage.13 Along similar lines, others have suggested that
implementing either Medicare for All or a more incremental health care
reform proposal would secure the right to health care.14 By contrast, some
advocates of Medicare for All have framed it as morally distinctive because
of its emphasis on reducing inequality, and have framed it as the only health
care reform that can secure the right to health care.15 Yet it is not clear from
these accounts why inequality in access to health care is objectionable, and
whether these objections extend to all forms of inequality in access.
This Article argues that there is in fact an important normative
difference between these two positions: namely, that the incremental and
Medicare for All proposals are supported by two different conceptions of the
right to health care.16 At base, these two conceptions reflect different views
about what kind of health care we owe to each other.17 These are not
disagreements about political feasibility or empirical projections, but rather
about moral or political values. Failure to recognize these conflicting values
means that health care reform advocates frequently talk past one another,
without confronting the underlying normative differences in their visions of

13. See, e.g., Harold Pollack, Single Payer Is Not a Principle, DEMOCRACY: J. OF IDEAS (Fall
2017), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/46/single-payer-is-not-a-principle/; see also
JONATHAN COHN, THE TEN YEAR WAR 329 (2021) (“[T]he distinctions between versions of
national health insurance aren’t so important in the grand scheme of things.”); Ronald Dworkin,
Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, 38 MCGILL L.J. 883, 894 (1993) (venturing that “whether
the United States ultimately chooses a single-payer scheme . . . or . . . a scheme that includes private
competition, is more likely to depend on considerations other than justice.”).
14. See, e.g., Jeneen Interlandi, Employer-Based Health Care, Meet Massive Unemployment,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/opinion/coronavirus-medicarefor-all.html.
15. See, e.g., Adam Gaffney, Single-Payer or Bust, DISSENT MAG., Spring 2018,
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/single-payer-or-bust-two-souls-universal-healthcare
(“[S]ingle-payer provides a distinct—and more egalitarian—vision of universality.”); Tim
Higginbotham & Chris Middleman, “Medicare-for-All” Means Something. Don’t Let Moderates
Water It Down., VOX (July 13, 2018, 9:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-bigidea/2018/7/13/17567952/medicare-for-all-centrists-copycat-plans-water-down-left-center-sanders
(“If we are truly committed to the idea of health care as a right, then we will eliminate the profit
motive and guarantee that all patients receive the same standard of treatment and breadth of
coverage.”).
16. To be clear, I do not mean that the proponents of Medicare for All and the incremental
reforms actually have these conceptions of the right to health care in mind, but rather that these
conceptions provide at least some degree of justificatory support for their respective positions.
17. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 15 (2008)
[hereinafter DANIELS, JUST HEALTH] (“[W]e may claim a right to health or health care only if it can
be harvested from an acceptable general theory of distributive justice or from a more particular
theory of justice for health and health care.”).
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health care reform. The goal of this Article is to bring to light these normative
differences.18
In brief, Medicare for All is supported by a conception of the right to
health care that is focused on equality in access to health care. This first
conception of the right to health care, which I term the Right to Equal Access,
is egalitarian, reflecting a concern with “the difference between what some
have and what others have, and for reducing this difference.”19 The Right to
Equal Access implies that unequal access to health care is objectionable, at
least to some extent. By contrast, the incremental vision of health care reform
is supported by a conception of the right to health care that is focused on
sufficient access to health care. This second conception, which I term the
Right to a Decent Minimum, is an example of what philosopher Harry
Frankfurt refers to as the “doctrine of sufficiency,” the idea that “what is
morally important . . . is that everyone should have enough.”20 The Right to
a Decent Minimum implies a right to access some fixed set of health care
benefits, and that inequality in health care access is not itself objectionable.21
There are different theories of justice in health care that have been
invoked to support the Right to Equal Access, and these theories have
different justifications and implications for health care reform. At one end
of the spectrum, what is sometimes referred to as the “insulation ideal”
implies that health care should be distributed on a completely equal basis to
all those who need it.22 A much more nuanced and comprehensive theory,
developed by philosopher Norman Daniels, posits that health care institutions
should be governed so as to ensure what John Rawls refers to as “fair equality
of opportunity.”23
Similarly, there are multiple theories of justice in health care that
support the Right to a Decent Minimum. Ronald Dworkin has developed
what he refers to as a “prudent insurance” ideal, which implies that the

18. In this effort, I follow in the footsteps of other health scholars who have explored different
ways that various features of the U.S. health care system reflect conflicting moral or political values.
See generally Avedis Donabedian, Social Responsibility for Personal Health Services: An
Examination of Basic Values, INQUIRY, June 1971, at 3; Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of
Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2011).
19. T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER? 1 (2018).
20. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON INEQUALITY 7 (2015).
21. The divide between those who view rights as requiring a sufficient distribution of goods
and those who view rights as requiring some degree of material equality has a long history and
extends well outside of the health care context. See generally SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018) (critiquing the human rights movement for
focusing on sufficiency and failing to address material inequality).
22. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 311
(2000) [hereinafter DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE].
23. See generally DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3.
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government should provide insurance coverage for those health care services
for which people would choose to purchase insurance coverage under certain
idealized conditions.24 A second influential account is a modified market
approach, which justifies providing a basic package of health care benefits
through market mechanisms on the basis that doing so will improve societal
welfare.25 Although these accounts do not explicitly invoke the language or
framework of “rights,” they each provide justifications for enacting a legal
right to health care.26 In particular, they each provide reasons in favor of
extending health insurance coverage to all Americans.
This Article examines these distinct conceptions of the right to health
care and their underlying distributional justifications, as well as the practical
differences in terms of what they mean for the future of health care reform.
Although there is not a single philosophical consensus about what kind of
health care we owe one another, we can learn something from examining the
different conceptions of the right to health care. Doing so shows that key
policy differences between the two categories of reforms reflect different
moral or political values. Yet it also shows that there is more room for
convergence among these two types of reforms than might otherwise be
expected, and it reveals that both categories of reforms fall short in at least
one important respect from the perspective of either conception of the right
to health care.
The divide between the Medicare for All and the incrementalist camps
seems likely to be a subject of political disagreement for years to come. It
dates back to the 1940s, when Democratic members of Congress first
introduced a bill that would have created a national universal health insurance
program.27 Nor has the ACA forged a consensus on this issue. Although the
implementation of the ACA appears to have increased public support for
universal health insurance coverage, it has not resolved the debate over the
form that coverage should take.28
24. See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 311.
25. See generally ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO
THE SOARING COST OF MEDICARE CARE (1980).
26. See generally Jennifer Prah Ruger, Theodore W. Ruger & George J. Annas, The Elusive
Right to Health Care Under U.S. Law, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 2558, 2558 (2015) (explaining how
there is currently no universal constitutional right to health care, but that “Congress and the Supreme
Court have incrementally crafted an incomplete web of health care rights during the past 50 years”).
27. See Jonathan Oberlander, Lessons from the Long and Winding Road to Medicare for All,
109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1497, 1498 (2019); Richard Sorian, Democrats’ Feud Over Health Care
Has
Deep
Roots,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(Aug.
19,
2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190815.209963/full/.
28. See Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment, 108 GEO.
L.J. 495, 558–66 (2020) (unearthing various ways that the legal and political battles over the ACA
have shifted Americans’ expectations surrounding health care); Nicole Huberfeld, Is Medicare for
All the Answer? Assessing the Health Reform Gestalt as the ACA Turns 10, 20 HOUST. J. HEALTH
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It is important, therefore, to understand the normative stakes of this
disagreement. Health care reform is not only an economic issue and a
political issue, but also a moral one.29 That is not to say that most people
subscribe to a particular theory of justice in health care, but rather that they
believe there are important moral reasons to support health care reform.30
Examining some of the more prominent accounts of justice in health care can
help to bring these reasons into sharper focus, to scrutinize them, and to better
understand their implications.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes Medicare for All and
the incremental proposals in more detail and outlines their approach to three
key policy areas: the scope of covered benefits, cost-sharing, and private
insurance. Part II describes two variants each of the Right to Equal Access
and the Right to a Decent Minimum and offers a brief sketch of the types of
justifications these accounts rely on, as well as some of the objections to
them. Part III examines the implications of these accounts with respect to the
three aforementioned key policy issues, and then compares these implications
to the actual approaches taken by Medicare for All and the incremental
proposals.

L. & POL’Y 69, 71 (2020) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Is Medicare for All the Answer?] (“The ACA
changed the American baseline principle from exclusion to inclusion—as I have called it elsewhere,
a principle of universality—and effectively kick-started a conversation about health care
expectations, which now appear to include universal coverage.”); Nicole Huberfeld, The
Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 67, 68 (2015) (“The
ACA shifted the law away from state-based private law to federally-based public law, shunned
exclusion, and began to embrace a concept of health care as a public good, one that is inclusive and
leveling.”).
29. See UWE E. REINHARDT, PRICED OUT: THE ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL COSTS OF
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 1 (2019) (“[A]t the heart of the debate [over health care reform] is a
long-simmering argument over the following question on distributive social ethics: To what extent
should the better-off members of society be made to be their poorer and sick brothers’ and sisters’
keepers in health care?”); Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 287, 290 (1993) (“The politics of health insurance can only be understood
as a struggle over the meaning of sickness and whether it should be a condition that automatically
generates mutual assistance.”).
30. See, e.g., Most Americans View Access to Health Care as a Moral Issue, HARRIS POLL,
https://theharrispoll.com/healthday-news-an-overwhelming-majority-of-americans-believes-thataccess-to-health-care-is-a-moral-issue-and-that-the-united-states-should-be-able-to-afforduniversal-health-care-if-other-develop/ (finding that 84% of U.S. adults agree with the statement
that “having a system that ensures that sick people get the care they need is a moral issue.”).
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I. TWO VISIONS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM
A. America’s Twin Access Problems
During the 2020 election cycle, even before the COVID-19 pandemic,
polls showed that health care had risen to the top of voters’ priorities.31 To
some extent, it is surprising that there would be such a groundswell of popular
support to revisit the issue of health care reform only ten years after the
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the most
important health care legislation to be passed since the 1965
Medicare/Medicaid Act.32 The ACA has had dramatic impacts on the health
care system: It drove the uninsured rate to record low levels;33 it led to
significant increases in access to health care, improvements in financial
security, and reductions in mortality;34 and it helped to reduce racial and
economic disparities in access to health care.35
Yet despite the progress made under the ACA, many Americans today
still lack adequate access to health care. The most glaring barrier is a lack of
affordability: Overall, around 1 in 10 Americans report delaying or forgoing
care because of its cost.36 The problem is even more acute for low-income
adults, over half of whom report skipping doctor visits, recommended tests,
or treatments due to cost.37
The affordability problem is in turn attributable in large part to the fact
that the United States still does not have universal health insurance coverage.
31. Tess Bonn, Poll: Voters Name Health Care as Top Issue Going into 2020, HILL (Dec. 12,
2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/474327-voters-name-health-care-as-top-issue-going-into2020.
32. See Isaac D. Buck, The Meaning of “Medicare-for-All”, 20 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
159, 161 (2020); Huberfeld, Is Medicare for All the Answer?, supra note 28, at 71. See generally
THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION: HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT TRANSFORMED
POLITICS, LAW, AND HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Abbe R. Gluck eds., 2020)
(examining the ACA’s political, legal, and policy legacies).
33. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE ECONOMIC RECORD OF THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: REFORMING THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 7 (2016).
34. See generally Benjamin D. Sommers, Atul A. Gawande & Katherine Baicker, Health
Insurance Coverage and Health—What the Recent Evidence Tells Us, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 586
(2017) (summarizing the empirical literature on the effects of the ACA on access to health care,
financial security, and health outcomes).
35. See, e.g., Kevin Griffith, Leigh Evans & Jacob Bor, The Affordable Care Act Reduced
Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care Access, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1503, 1508 (2017); Thomas
C. Buchmueller & Helen G. Levy, The ACA’s Impact on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health
Insurance Coverage and Access to Care, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 395, 399–400 (2020).
36. Krutika Amin et al., How Does Cost Affect Access to Care?, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH
SYSTEM TRACKER (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/costaffect-access-care/#item-about-1-in-10-adults-report-that-they-delayed-or-did-not-get-carebecause-of-its-cost_2017.
37. Michelle M. Doty et al., Income-Related Inequality in Affordability and Access to Primary
Care in Eleven High-Income Countries, 40 HEALTH AFFS. 113, 115–16 (2021).
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Twenty-eight million people in the United States were uninsured as of 2020
(down from around fifty million before the passage of the ACA),38 and
uninsured individuals are much more likely to delay or avoid seeking medical
care due to cost.39 But even for those Americans who have insurance
coverage, many still pay significant “out-of-pocket payments”—in the form
of deductibles, copays, or coinsurance—when they utilize health care
services.40 Deductibles in particular have both become more prevalent and
grown substantially over time.41 Because of these costs, simply having health
insurance does not guarantee having adequate access to care: Many
Americans who have health insurance still report delaying or forgoing needed
medical care due to cost.42
Not only is access to medical care in the United States inadequate, it is
also deeply inequitable: Americans have markedly different abilities to
access medical care, depending on their wealth and income, race, gender,
geographic location, and other factors.43 One important factor contributing
to these disparities in access is the United States’ fragmented health care
financing system, which relies on a mix of private insurance (mostly
employer-sponsored coverage, as well as some non-group coverage), and

38. KATHERINE KEISLER-STARKEY & LISA N. BUNCH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2020, at 2 (2021).
39. Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, The Uninsured and the ACA: A
Primer—Key Facts About Health Insurance and the Uninsured Amidst Changes to the Affordable
Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/the-uninsuredand-the-aca-a-primer-key-facts-about-health-insurance-and-the-uninsured-amidst-changes-to-theaffordable-care-act-how-does-lack-of-insurance-affect-access-to-care/.
40. See CHRISTOPHER T. ROBERTSON, EXPOSED: WHY OUR HEALTH INSURANCE IS
INCOMPLETE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 1 (2019).
41. See GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2019
ANNUAL 107–10 (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-AnnualSurvey-2019; Isaac D. Buck, Affording Obamacare, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 261, 280–81 (2020).
42. See LIZ HAMEL, CAILEY MUÑANA & MOLLYANN BRODIE, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
/ LA TIMES SURVEY OF ADULTS WITH EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE 10 (2019),
https://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-KFF-LA-Times-Survey-of-Adults-with-EmployerSponsored-Health-Insurance (reporting that “about half (51 percent) of adults with employer health
coverage report that they or someone in their household has skipped or delayed some type of
medical care or prescription drugs in the past 12 months because of the cost”).
43. See Allison K. Hoffman & Mark A. Hall, The American Pathology of Inequitable Access
to Medical Care, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW 213, 213 (David
Orentlicher & Tamara Hervey eds., 2020) (“What most defines access to healthcare in the United
States may be its stark inequity.”); JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID,
FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL POLITICS 54 (2018) (“Medicaid provides uneven and inconsistent
access to policy benefits across geographic space.”); Samuel L. Dickman, David U Himmelstein &
Steffie Woolhandler, Inequality and the Health-Care System in the USA, 389 LANCET 1431 (2017);
Doty et al., supra note 37, at 117 (surveying 11 high-income countries and finding that “incomerelated disparities in health status, affordability, and primary care access were most pronounced in
the US”).
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public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.44 The drafters of the ACA
intentionally preserved this fragmented structure under the theory that the
law would be much more likely to be enacted if it did not radically alter the
status quo.45
Discrepancies among different sources of insurance coverage mean that
even those Americans who have health insurance coverage in practice have
quite different abilities to access medical care.46 Although the ACA created
more uniformity in terms of what benefits insurers must cover and what kinds
of cost-sharing they can impose,47 different plans may still vary in terms of
their cost-sharing, their provider networks, their reimbursement rates, and
their covered benefits.48 These differences contribute to disparities in access
to care. For instance, in part because the Medicaid program pays physicians
around two-thirds of Medicare reimbursement rates, fewer physicians are
willing to treat Medicaid patients, meaning that Medicaid enrollees may have
more difficulty accessing certain kinds of care—particularly specialty care.49
The inequalities created by this fragmented health care financing system
are compounded by longstanding racial and economic disparities. People of
color are more likely to be uninsured,50 and are also more likely to suffer
discriminatory treatment in medical settings,51 both of which may cause them

44. See generally EINER R. ELHAUGE, THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES
AND SOLUTIONS (2010).
45. See Erin C. Fuse Brown et al., Social Solidarity in Health Care, American-Style, 48 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 411, 412 (2020) (“The ACA’s core compromise on coverage preserved the existing
fragmentary mix of public and private sources, rather than replacing it with a truly universal and
unified system.”); Allison K. Hoffman, What Health Reform Reveals about Health Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 49, 56 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William
M. Sage eds., 2017) (“Politically no law would have passed without the support of—or at least
without active opposition from—the insurance industry.”); Jonathan Oberlander & Theodore R.
Marmor, The Health Bill Explained at Last, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 19, 2010,
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/08/19/health-bill-explained-last/
(“[T]he
central
assumption of both the Obama administration and the Democratic leadership in Congress was that
only legislation that did not seek to radically change [the health care system] had a chance of
success.”).
46. See Hoffman & Hall, supra note 43.
47. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1585–92 (2011) (outlining the main changes that the
ACA made to the individual and small-group markets).
48. See Hoffman & Hall, supra note 43; Dickman et al., supra note 43.
49. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid Payments and Access to Care, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2345, 2345–46 (2014).
50. EDWARD R. BERCHICK, JESSICA C. BARNETT & RACHEL D. UPTON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018, at 16 (2019).
51. See generally DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (2015) (arguing that unconscious racism in the health
care delivery system is a fundamental driver of health disparities in America).
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to delay or avoid seeking treatment.52 The hospitals and clinics that Black
Americans use also tend to be lower quality, staffed by less qualified
providers and stocked with fewer resources.53 The COVID-19 pandemic has
reflected these preexisting disparities: Inequalities in access to high-quality
health care likely help to explain why Black, Latino, and Indigenous
populations have been disproportionately likely to suffer serious illness or
death as a result of contracting COVID-19.54
Likewise, lower-income Americans are less likely to be insured,55 to be
able to pay any associated deductibles or copayments, or to have the
education or social connections that can be essential in navigating the
Byzantine American health care system.56 Lower-income workers are less
likely to receive health insurance coverage through their employer, and those
that do face much higher deductibles.57 Again, the COVID-19 pandemic has
brought these inequalities in access into sharp relief, as wealthy and powerful
individuals have benefitted from better access to testing, cutting-edge
treatments, and vaccines, while many less-privileged individuals have had a
much more difficult time getting tested or obtaining medical treatment.58
52. See, e.g., Marcella Alsan & Marianne Wanamaker, Tuskegee and the Health of Black Men,
133 Q.J. ECON. 407 (2018) (finding that the 1972 disclosure of the Tuskegee Study was linked to
increases in mistrust of the medical profession, decreases in physician interactions, and reduced life
expectancy for Black men); Garfield et al., supra note 39 (“Uninsured people are far more likely
than those with insurance to postpone health care or forgo it altogether. The consequences can be
severe, particularly when preventable conditions or chronic diseases go undetected.”).
53. Angus Deaton, What Does the Empirical Evidence Tell Us About the Injustice of Health
Inequalities?, in INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH: CONCEPTS, MEASURES, AND ETHICS 263, 268 (Nir Eyal
et al. eds., 2013).
54. See Michele K. Evans, Health Equity—Are We Finally on the Edge of a New Frontier?,
383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 997, 997 (2020); Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural
Racism, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 10–15 (2020).
55. Robin A. Cohen, Emily P. Terlizzi & Michael E. Martinez, Health Insurance Coverage:
Early Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, 2018, NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STAT. 3 (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201905.pdf; Peter
J. Cunningham, Why Even Healthy Low-Income People Have Greater Health Risks Than HigherIncome
People,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(Sept.
27,
2018),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/healthy-low-income-people-greater-health-risks.
56. See PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN:
POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 30–31 (2018); MICHENER, supra note 43, at 126–27; Hoffman
& Hall, supra note 43.
57. Drew Altman, Employer-Based Coverage is Unaffordable for Low-Wage Workers, AXIOS
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.axios.com/employer-based-coverage-is-unaffordable-for-low-wageworkers-f6855a5e-83ed-452e-825a-7ed966dd0f3b.html; Gary Claxton, Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia
Cox, How Affordability of Health Care Varies by Incomes Among People with Employer Coverage,
PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/howaffordability-of-health-care-varies-by-income-among-people-with-employer-coverage/#item-start.
58. See Shamus Khan, How Rich People Will Cut the Line for the Coronavirus Vaccine, WASH.
POST (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/coronavirus-vaccine-richpeople/2020/12/18/3a2f188e-40ae-11eb-8bc0-ae155bee4aff_story.html; Casey Ross & Priyanka
Runwal, ‘Covid is All About Privilege’: Trump’s Treatment Underscores Vast Inequalities in Access
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Although there are a variety of different factors that affect access to
care,59 the health care reform debate in the United States has long primarily
focused on the goal of universal health insurance coverage.60 Of note, the
lack of insurance coverage results in both the lack of adequate access to
health care services and inequalities in access to health care. By contrast,
other factors contribute to inequalities in access to care, but do not necessarily
result in inadequate access to care. For instance, although Medicaid’s lower
reimbursement rates have contributed to Medicaid beneficiaries having
worse access to some forms of specialty care than those with private health
coverage, this does not by itself imply that they have inadequate access.61
B. Proposed Reforms
Faced with these challenges, policymakers have put forward a dizzying
array of health care reform plans.62 These plans aim to improve the
affordability of health care by reforming our health care financing system:
they would all expand health insurance coverage to many more Americans,
and in doing so, they would likely significantly improve access to health care,
increase financial security, and reduce socioeconomic and health
disparities.63 However, there are important differences among these plans.

to Care, STAT (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/10/06/covid-is-all-about-privilegetrumps-treatment-underscores-vast-inequalities-in-access-to-care/; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump
and Friends Got Coronavirus Care Many Others Couldn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-treatments.html.
59. See generally Roy Penchansky & J. William Thomas, The Concept of Access: Definition
and Relationship to Consumer Satisfaction, 19 MED. CARE 127 (1981) (developing a taxonomic
definition of access to health care that includes five dimensions: availability, accessibility,
accommodation, affordability, and acceptability).
60. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE
OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM 27 (2011) (“For American liberals in the twentieth century, health
insurance for all was a persistent dream and a perennial disappointment, often on the horizon but
always seemingly just beyond reach.”).
61. See Julia Paradise, Data Note: Three Findings About Access to Care and Health Outcomes
in Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/datanote-three-findings-about-access-to-care-and-health-outcomes-in-medicaid/ (noting that “[m]ost
doctors accept new Medicaid patients” and that “[d]ata and research provide evidence that Medicaid
provides effective access to care for those it covers”).
62. See Compare Medicare-for-All and Public Plan Proposals, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 15,
2019), https://www.kff.org/interactive/compare-medicare-for-all-public-plan-proposals/; Dylan
Scott, The Real Differences Between the 2020 Democrats’ Health Care Plans, Explained, VOX
(Dec. 19, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/19/21005124/2020presidential-candidates-health-care-democratic-debate.
63. Scott, supra note 62 (“The Democrats running agree on a few key themes: Everybody
should have health insurance; health insurance should cover most medical services; and people
should pay less money for health care, both for premiums and out-of-pocket expenses, than they do
now.”).
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At a general level, the plans fall into two broad camps. The first
category of plans, referred to as “Medicare for All,” would create a new
universal federal health insurance program that would be far more generous
and expansive than any program that currently exists.64 The second category
of plans, such as President Biden’s plan, would expand coverage to most or
all Americans, while preserving key features of the existing health care
financing system.65 There are multiple examples of each kind of proposal,
which differ in certain respects. To simplify, I will focus primarily on
Senator Sanders’s Medicare for All proposal and President Biden’s plan—as
described during his 2020 Presidential campaign—each of which is described
below.
1. Medicare for All
The first category of plans is referred to as “Medicare for All.” At the
outset, it is important to note that the name “Medicare for All” is somewhat
misleading. Medicare for All would not, as its name suggests, simply extend
eligibility for the Medicare program, as it currently exists, to all Americans.66
Instead, it would create a new universal federal health insurance program that
would be far more generous and expansive,67 and far less reliant on the
private sector.68
64. Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. (2019); Medicare for All Act of 2019,
H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. (2019).
65. During the presidential election, President Biden’s campaign estimated that his plan would
cover “more than an estimated 97% of Americans.” Health Care, supra note 5. The Urban Institute
has estimated that a proposal similar to Biden’s would cover all legal United States residents,
leaving 2% of U.S. residents uninsured overall. Linda J. Blumberg, Cutting Through the Jargon:
Health Care Reform Design Issues and Trade-Offs Facing Us Today, URB. INST. 12 (June 2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102326/cutting-through-the-jargon-healthcare-reform-design-issues-and-trade-offs-facing-us-today.pdf. Some other estimates have been
slightly lower, though the plan’s effects are difficult to estimate accurately without more details.
See Biden’s Healthcare Proposals, UNIV. OF PA. WHARTON SCH. OF BUS. (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2020/10/6/biden-healthcare-proposals (estimating
that the Biden plan would reduce the uninsured rate to 6% by 2030, but stating that this estimate
does not take into account the effects of Biden’s public option as “this rather complicated proposal
lacks enough detail to model”).
66. Huberfeld, Is Medicare for All the Answer?, supra note 28, at 84 (“Current proposals do
not reflect precise use of the word Medicare but rather something more atmospheric, meaning some
kind of legislative reform that offers more in the way of national public insurance. ‘Medicare’ is
used as a public relations tool, knowing it is a politically popular program that could draw in public
support . . . .”); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medicare for All: Four Inconvenient Truths, 20
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 133, 137 (2020) (noting that “M4A [Medicare for All] differs in a
variety of fundamental respects from the Medicare program that currently exists”).
67. Micah Johnson, Sanjay Kishore & Donald M. Berwick, Medicare For All: An Analysis of
Key Policy Issues, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 133, 133 (2020) (defining Medicare for All as “a single public
insurance plan that provides comprehensive health coverage to all Americans”).
68. Private companies play important roles in Medicare today, from helping administer the
program and processing claims to delivering benefits through Medicare Part C (also known as

158

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:144

Medicare for All departs from the incremental health care reform
proposals in at least three key respects: First, Medicare for All would cover
a broader set of benefits than many of the incremental proposals, including
dental, vision, medical transportation, and comprehensive reproductive
services.69 Importantly, it would also cover home and community-based
long-term care services.70 At present, long-term care is primarily covered by
the Medicaid program, and is only available for those who have almost no
income or assets.71 Not only would the list of benefits covered under
Medicare for All be significantly more expansive than those covered by
Medicare currently, but also it would be more comprehensive than the benefit
packages covered by many other countries’ single-payer health care
systems.72
Second, Medicare for All would eliminate cost-sharing (such as
copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles), with the exception that Senator
Sanders’s Medicare for All bill would allow up to $200 per year of costsharing for prescription drugs for households with incomes over 200% of the
federal poverty level.73 This too would represent a substantial departure from
the status quo, since currently Medicare has significant cost-sharing
requirements.74 In 2016, for example, Medicare beneficiaries spent $5,460
on average out of their own pockets on health care.75
Third, Medicare for All would transform a fragmented health care
financing system into a nearly uniform one in which all Americans would be
covered under a single government program. This program would largely
Medicare Advantage) and delivering prescription drug insurance through Medicare Part D. See
Sherry A. Glied & Jeanne M. Lambrew, How Democratic Candidates for the Presidency in 2020
Could Choose Among Public Health Insurance Plans, 37 HEALTH AFFS. 2084, 2085 (2018);
Huberfeld, Is Medicare for All the Answer?, supra note 28, at 83.
69. Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 201 (2019).
70. Id.
71. See Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 147, 162–65 (2016).
72. See Sherry Glied et al., Considering ‘Single Payer’ Proposals in the U.S.: Lessons from
Abroad, COMMONWEALTH FUND 4–5 (2019); CONG. BUDGET OFF., KEY DESIGN COMPONENTS
AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING A SINGLE-PAYER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 9 (2019),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/55150-singlepayer.pdf.
73. Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 202 (2019).
74. Medicare Part A, which covers inpatient hospital stays, skilled nursing facility stays, home
health visits, and hospice care, had a deductible of $1,364 in 2019. Medicare Part B, which covers
physician visits, outpatient services, preventive services, and some home health visits had a
deductible of $185 in 2019 and typically has coinsurance of 20%, meaning that beneficiaries must
pay 20% of their total costs of care after meeting their deductible. An Overview of Medicare,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/an-overview-ofmedicare/.
75. Juliette Cubanski et al., How Much Do Medicare Beneficiaries Spend Out of Pocket on
Health Care?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issuebrief/how-much-do-medicare-beneficiaries-spend-out-of-pocket-on-health-care/.
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subsume existing public health care programs, including the traditional
Medicare program, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP).76 It would also radically curtail the role of private health insurance.77
It would prohibit private insurers from offering duplicative insurance
coverage that covers services already offered by the new public program.78
Although Medicare for All would technically allow supplemental insurance
that covers services not covered in the public plan,79 it would have an
extremely limited role (likely in practice limited to nursing home care), given
the expansive range of benefits covered by Medicare for All.80 Likewise,

76. Katie Keith & Timothy Jost, Unpacking the Sanders Medicare-For-All Bill, HEALTH AFFS.
BLOG (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170914.061996/full/.
77. Some health scholars and politicians have used the term “Medicare for All” more
expansively as encompassing proposals that entail a mix of public and private insurance programs.
See, e.g., William M. Sage, Adding Principle to Pragmatism: The Transformative Potential of
“Medicare-for-All” in Post-Pandemic Health Reform, 20 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 1,
9 (2021) (outlining “six possible ways to implement Medicare-for-All reform”). Perhaps most
notably, Vice President Kamala Harris introduced a health care plan in July 2019 that she termed
“Medicare for All,” though it preserved a significant role for private insurers. Kamala Harris, My
Plan for Medicare for All, MEDIUM (July 29, 2019), https://medium.com/@KamalaHarris/my-planfor-medicare-for-all-7730370dd421. See also Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Is
There a Middle Road on Medicare-For-All? Kamala Harris Thinks So, WASH. POST (July 30,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2019/07/30/thehealth-202-is-there-a-middle-road-on-medicare-for-all-kamala-harris-thinksso/5d3f5340602ff17879a18729/ (“[W]hat Harris is proposing now isn’t quite Medicare-for-all. It’s
more like Medicare Advantage-for-all.”). More generally, Jonathan Oberlander distinguishes
between the “hybrid” model of Medicare for All, which would allow private insurance plans, and
the “pure” model of Medicare for All, which would prohibit private insurance. Jonathan
Oberlander, Navigating the Shifting Terrain of US Health Care Reform—Medicare for All, Single
Payer, and the Public Option, 97 MILBANK Q. 939, 943–44 (2019). This Article refers to Medicare
for All in the “pure” sense, which is the basis for current legislation bearing the name “Medicare
for All” and reflects the original meaning of the term. See id. at 944 (noting that “[t]he pure
model . . . is how the health reform community has until now generally understood Medicare for
All”). See also Buck, The Meaning of “Medicare-for-All”, supra note 32, at 166–67 (distinguishing
between “Medicare for some” and the “classic version of ‘Medicare-for-All’”).
78. Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 107(a) (2019).
79. Id. § 107(b).
80. Karen Pollitz et al., What’s The Role of Private Health Insurance Today and Under
Medicare-for-All and Other Public Option Proposals?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 30, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/whats-the-role-of-private-health-insurance-todayand-under-medicare-for-all-and-other-public-option-proposals/. By contrast, the Medicare for All
bill introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Jayapal would prohibit this type of private
coverage as well since it covers institutional long-term care. Id. The Sanders Medicare for All bill
would also allow for coverage of private contracting between patients and health care providers who
do not participate in the new Medicare program, but the Jayapal bill would prohibit this practice.
Id. Although Senator Sanders has often mentioned cosmetic surgery insurance as another type of
private supplemental insurance that Medicare for All would allow, there is in fact currently no
market for insurance that covers only the costs of cosmetic surgery. Margot Sanger-Katz, Some
Democrats Talk About Cosmetic Surgery Insurance. It Doesn’t Exist., N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/upshot/democrats-cosmetic-surgery-insurancemedicare.html.
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since Medicare for All would virtually eliminate cost-sharing, it would render
unnecessary complementary insurance, which covers cost-sharing under the
public plan.81 Again, this would be a substantial departure from the status
quo. Currently, many Medicare beneficiaries purchase private insurance
policies—such as Medigap policies—that shield them from large out-ofpocket expenses and provide access to services not covered by Medicare.82
2. Incremental Proposals
The second category of health care reform plans are sometimes referred
to as “incremental” proposals.83 This too is something of a misnomer since
each of these proposals would, if enacted, represent a significant departure
from the status quo by significantly expanding health insurance coverage,
and in some cases, specifically increasing public coverage.84 Indeed, some
of these proposals include specific policies that were considered too radical
to be included in the ACA only ten years earlier.85 For instance, some
incremental proposals would create an option for certain populations to buy
into Medicare or Medicaid,86 while still others would focus on expanding
subsidies on the ACA exchanges.87 The perception of these proposals as
81. Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 136.
82. Juliette Cubanski et al., A Primer on Medicare: Key Facts About the Medicare Program
and
the
People
It
Covers,
KAISER
FAM.
FOUND.
(Mar.
20,
2015),
https://www.kff.org/medicare/report/a-primer-on-medicare-key-facts-about-the-medicareprogram-and-the-people-it-covers/.
83. See, e.g., Caitlin Owens, Health Care’s Two Political Realities, AXIOS (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/medicare-for-all-incremental-reform-health-care-2020-democratsd16e0c83-8e49-4bf6-8eb9-40ddc014936f.html.
84. See Matthew Yglesias, Joe Biden’s Health Care Plan, Explained, VOX (July 16, 2019,
11:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/7/16/20694598/joe-biden-health-care-plan-public-option
(arguing that Joe Biden’s health care plan would, “if implemented, arguably be the most dramatic
piece of new social legislation since the Great Society”).
85. See Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29
HEALTH AFFS. 1117, 1117, 1119 (2010).
86. See, e.g., Medicare at 50 Act, S. 470, 116th Cong. (2019); Medicare Buy-In and Health
Care Stabilization Act of 2019, H.R. 1346, 116th Cong. (2019); State Public Option Act, S. 489,
H.R. 1277, 116th Cong. (2019).
87. See, e.g., Protecting Pre-Existing Conditions and Making Health Care More Affordable Act
of 2019, H.R. 1884, 116th Cong. (2019). Of note, in March 2021, President Biden signed into law
the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), which builds on the ACA’s coverage provisions in several
ways, including by increasing the generosity of subsidies for private coverage on the ACA
exchanges for two years. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (2021)
§§ 9661–9663. In addition, at the time this Article was going to print, the House of Representatives
had just narrowly passed the Build Back Better Act, which would further expand on the health
coverage provisions in ARPA if enacted into law. See generally Edwin Park et al., Build Back
Better Act: Health Coverage Provisions Explained, GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POL’Y INST.:
CTR. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (Nov. 2021), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/11/Build-Back-Better-FINAL-Nov19.pdf (explaining the Act’s Medicaid,
CHIP, and private insurance provisions).

2021]

EQUALITY AND SUFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE REFORM

161

incremental reflects how far the debate over health care reform has shifted
over the past ten years, at least on the Democratic side.88 Nevertheless, these
proposals are incremental compared to Medicare for All in the sense that they
largely preserve the three key features of the current health care financing
system that Medicare for All would transform or eliminate.
First, the incremental proposals would, for the most part, cover a similar
set of health benefits to those that are covered by existing health programs.89
The Biden plan would introduce a public option that would cover the ten
categories of benefits deemed “essential health benefits” (EHBs) under the
ACA.90 These include ambulatory patient services, emergency services,
hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use
disorder services, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services
and devices, laboratory services, preventive and wellness services and
chronic disease management, and pediatric services.91 These EHB categories
have significant gaps: for instance, they do not cover custodial long-term care
(either at home or at an institution), routine non-pediatric dental care, or
routine non-pediatric vision care.92
Second, these plans would still require a substantial level of costsharing, although some of them would reduce cost-sharing to some degree.
The Biden plan would increase the size of the tax credits offered on the ACA
exchanges by linking them to so-called “gold” insurance plans that cover
80% of medical costs.93 This provision would result in lower deductibles,
copayments, and out-of-pocket maximums.94 Other prominent public option
proposals would continue to apply the current cost-sharing limits in existing
health care programs.95

88. Julie Rovner, Biden’s ‘Incremental’ Health Plan Still Would Be a Heavy Lift, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (July 22, 2019), https://khn.org/news/bidens-incremental-health-plan-still-wouldbe-a-heavy-lift/.
89. See Side-by-Side Comparison of Medicare-for-All and Public Plan Proposals Introduced
in
the
116th
Congress,
KAISER
FAM.
FOUND.
4
(May
15,
2019),
https://files.kff.org/attachment/Table-Side-by-Side-Comparison-Medicare-for-all-Public-PlanProposals-116th-Congress [hereinafter Side-by-Side Comparison].
90. Scott, supra note 62.
91. Affordable Care Act § 1302(b), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1) (2010).
92. Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark Plans, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/ehb (last visited
Oct. 30, 2021).
93. Health Care, supra note 5.
94. Scott, supra note 62; LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., URB. INST., FROM INCREMENTAL TO
COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM: HOW VARIOUS REFORM OPTIONS COMPARE ON
COVERAGE
AND
COSTS
16–17
(2019),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2019/10/15/from_incremental_to_comprehensive_health
_insurance_reform-how_various_reform_options_compare_on_coverage_and_costs.pdf.
95. Side-by-Side Comparison, supra note 89, at 5.
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Third, the incremental proposals would maintain the current patchwork
of health insurance programs, and in particular preserve a role for private
insurance. President Biden’s plan would lower the Medicare eligibility age
to sixty, expand the subsidies on the ACA exchanges, and create a new
Medicare-like “public option” that would compete with private insurers on
the ACA exchanges.96 The public option would offer premium-free coverage
for people who currently fall into the Medicaid “coverage gap,” who are
ineligible for Medicaid because their state has declined to expand Medicaid
under the ACA, and it would automatically enroll low-income beneficiaries
when they interact with certain institutions like public schools, or programs
geared toward low-income people.97 Although this program would increase
the number of Americans enrolled in public coverage, Americans would still
be allowed to enroll in private coverage, and many—if not most—people
with employer-based coverage would be expected to keep it.98
II. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
The two categories of health care reform proposals discussed above are
supported by two distinct conceptions of the right to health care. By this, I
do not necessarily mean that these conceptions have different notions of what
it means for something to be a “right,” but rather that they differ in terms of

96. There are other public option proposals as well. See, e.g., Keeping Health Insurance
Affordable Act of 2019, S. 3, 116th Cong. (2019); Choose Medicare Act, S. 1261, 116th Cong.
(2019). A public option was originally included in the version of the ACA passed by the House of
Representatives, but it was excised from the Senate version after objections from Senators Ben
Nelson and Joe Lieberman. See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 136–
37 (2011).
97. Health Care, supra note 5; Joe Biden, Joe Biden Outlines New Steps to Ease Economic
Burden on Working People, MEDIUM (Apr. 9, 2020), https://medium.com/@JoeBiden/joe-bidenoutlines-new-steps-to-ease-economic-burden-on-working-people-e3e121037322.
There are
estimated to be more than two million uninsured adults who fall into the Medicaid coverage gap.
See Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor
Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-thatdo-not-expand-medicaid/.
98. See Dylan Scott, Joe Biden’s Health Care Plan, Explained in 800 Words, VOX (Nov. 6,
2020,
10:50
AM),
https://www.vox.com/21540041/election-2020-joe-biden-health-care
(explaining that Biden’s plan would likely not result in an exodus from employer coverage since it
would not allow employees to use their employers’ contributions to their health insurance premiums
to pay for coverage through the public option, nor would it allow employers to place their employees
on the public plan). The Urban Institute estimated that around 18.5 million people would drop
employer-sponsored coverage under the proposal upon which an earlier version of the Biden plan
appeared to be based, leaving nearly 130 million people enrolled in employer coverage. LINDA J.
BLUMBERG ET AL., URB. INST. & ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., The Healthy America
Program,
An
Update
and
Additional
Options
10
(Sept.
2019),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/100910/the_healthy_america_program_an_u
pdate-1_2.pdf.
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the scope of that right and what it entails.99 In brief, the Right to a Decent
Minimum entails a right to some basic level of health care.100 This right is
grounded in the notion of “sufficiency,” the idea that what is morally
important is that people have enough.101 By contrast, the Right to Equal
Access is egalitarian, meaning that there should be some level of equality in
health care access.102 The Right to Equal Access implies that differences in
people’s access to health care may be objectionable even if everyone has
access to a decent minimum of health care services. Put more succinctly, the
Right to Equal Access diagnoses the problem with the U.S. health care
system as one of unequal access, whereas the Right to a Decent Minimum
implies that the problem is one of inadequate access.
In order to fully understand the scope and implications of these two
conceptions of the right to health care, we must examine their underlying
distributional justifications.103 In this Part, I consider two prominent
accounts of the Right to Equal Access: one based on what is sometimes
referred to as the “insulation ideal” and one based on the idea of fair equality
of opportunity. Then I consider two prominent accounts of the Right to a
Decent Minimum: one based on a prudent insurance package and one based
on a modified market conception.
Each of these accounts has its own assumptions and premises, many of
which are quite complex and rich, and I cannot do justice to all of the issues
that they raise in this Article. Moreover, the list of accounts in this Part is by
no means exhaustive; at the end of this Part, I briefly consider a few other
accounts that support these different conceptions of the right to health care.
Nevertheless, even offering a basic sketch of the four distributional accounts
below provides a sense of the range of different justifications for providing a
legal entitlement to health care, their different implications in terms of what
the right to health care implies, and the challenges they entail.

99. This article does not address the specific ways in which these accounts may differ in terms
of what it means for health care to be a “right,” or the many associated conceptual and
jurisprudential questions surrounding rights more generally. See generally Wenar, supra note 2.
100. See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown, Developing A Durable Right to Health Care, 14 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 439, 445 (2013) (defining the right to health care as “the non-excludable right to
access and receive some minimum level of health care services”).
101. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
103. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 5 (“[T]he appeal to a right to health care is
not an appropriate starting point for an inquiry into just health care. Rights are not moral fruits that
spring up from bare earth, fully ripened, without cultivation. Rather, we are justified in claiming a
right to health care only if it can be harvested from an acceptable, general theory of distributive
justice, or, more particularly, from a theory of justice for health care.”).
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A. The Right to Equal Access
Accounts of the Right to Equal Access share two features: First, they
are egalitarian, in the sense that they are concerned with limiting inequality
in access to health care. This is either because there is something about
unequal access to health care that is intrinsically objectionable (perhaps
because it signals unequal respect for persons or conflicts with the notion that
life is priceless) or because it has consequences that are undesirable (such as
undermining equality of opportunity).104 The second common feature of
these accounts is presupposed by the first—namely, that health care is
“special,” such that there are special reasons why health care should be
distributed equally, which may or may not apply to other goods and
services.105 In particular, these accounts imply that health care should not be
treated as a commodity, like cars or televisions, and should not be distributed
based on ability to pay.106 Many people share this intuition (even those who
do not find inequalities to be particularly objectionable in other contexts),
though it is not necessarily obvious why health care should have any special
moral significance.107
As a result of these two shared features, accounts of the Right to Equal
Access also must contend with two challenges: The first is how to ensure that
demands for equality in access to health care do not lead to a “leveling down”
of health care services (i.e., making the rich worse off while not making
anyone else better off),108 while at the same time not turning into a
“bottomless pit” that consumes all of society’s resources.109 Second, insofar
104. Harry Frankfurt draws this same distinction in the context of economic inequality, referring
to the latter as “derivative[]” reasons why inequality is objectionable, and the latter as reasons that
“attribute[] to economic equality . . . intrinsic value.” FRANKFURT, supra note 20, at 17. Frankfurt
himself argues that economic inequality is not in itself intrinsically objectionable, but suggests that
it may lead to objectionable consequences. Id. at 16–17. T.M. Scanlon makes a related distinction:
According to Scanlon, economic inequality may be considered objectionable for reasons that have
nothing to do with inequality (for instance, because it leads to negative consequences such as worse
health outcomes), or for reasons that “are grounded, ultimately, in some idea of why equality itself
is to be sought, or why inequality itself is objectionable.” SCANLON, supra note 19, at 2. Scanlon
refers to the former types of reasons as ones that are egalitarian in a “broader” sense, and the latter
that are egalitarian in a “narrower” sense. Id.
105. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 17.
106. Shlomi Segall, Is Health Care (Still) Special?, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 342, 343 (2007).
107. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 18.
108. SCANLON, supra note 19, at 3.
109. Norman Daniels, Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 146,
148 (1981) (citing CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 126ff (1978)). See also Charles Fried,
Equality and Rights in Medical Care, 6 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 29, 31 (1976) (“[I]f we commit
ourselves to the notion that there is a right to whatever health care might be available, we do indeed
get ourselves into a difficult situation where overall national expenditure on health must reach
absurd proportions—absurd in the sense that far more is devoted to health at the expense of other
important social goals than the population in general wants. . . . And if we recognize that it would
be absurd to commit our society to devote more than a certain proportion of our national income to
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as the special moral importance of health care rests on the special moral
importance of health, each of these accounts must grapple with the fact that
there are other goods and services (e.g., public health interventions,
education, housing) that may play a larger role in determining health
outcomes than medical care.110 Therefore, to the extent that the demand for
equality in health care access is based on the contribution of medical care to
health outcomes, it would seem to apply—with equal or greater force—to
these other goods and services.
This Section below focuses on two prominent accounts of the Right to
Equal Access: one that is sometimes referred to as the insulation ideal and
one that is based on the idea of fair equality of opportunity. In several
respects, the insulation ideal and the fair equality of opportunity account are
strange bedfellows. The fair equality of opportunity account is a
comprehensive philosophical account of justice in health care, whereas the
insulation ideal reflects an intuitive aversion to rationing health care that is
untenable in practice. In addition, the insulation ideal demands complete
equality in access to all forms of health care that provide any health benefit,
whereas the fair equality of opportunity account requires only equal access
to certain kinds of health care services. Nevertheless, these approaches are
helpful to consider together because together, they provide a sense of the
broad range of different approaches to limiting inequality in health care and
the different challenges facing such approaches.
1. The Insulation Ideal
The most extreme account of the Right to Equal Access is variously
referred to as the insulation ideal or the rescue principle.111 According to
Ronald Dworkin (who describes this ideal but opposes it himself), this
position has three features: (1) that health care (by which he appears to mean
exclusively medical care) is the most important social good, because life and
health, while at the same time recognizing a ‘right to health care,’ we might then be caught on the
other horn of the dilemma. For we might then be required to say that because a right to health care
implies a right to equality of health care, then we must limit, we must lower the quality of the health
care that might be purchased by some lest our commitment to equality require us to provide such
care to all and thus carry us over a reasonable budget limit.”).
110. See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Bradley et al., Variation in Health Outcomes: The Role of Spending
on Social Services, Public Health, and Health Care, 2000–09, 35 HEALTH AFFS. 760, 760 (2016)
(“Taken together, social, behavioral, and environmental factors are estimated to contribute to more
than 70 percent of some types of cancer cases, 80 percent of cases of heart disease, and 90 percent
of cases of stroke.”).
111. See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 309; Dworkin, Justice in the
Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 885. Similarly, Einer Elhauge calls the “absolutist
position” the idea “that health care should be provided whenever it has any positive health benefit,
denouncing as immoral any attempt to weigh health against mere monetary costs.” Einer Elhauge,
Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1994).
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health are the most important things; (2) that health care should be distributed
equally even in a society that is rife with inequality; and (3) that it is
“intolerable” when needed health care is “withheld on grounds of
economy.”112 A health care system that satisfied the insulation ideal would
ensure equal access to health care by providing all the health care services
that promoted health to everyone who needed it.
Although the insulation ideal is less often defended than invoked to
present a point of contrast with another theory of justice in health care,113 a
few rough justifications have been offered for this position. For instance,
some proponents deny the “act/omission” distinction, concluding that failing
to save a life is the same as killing;114 others draw on religious beliefs and the
sanctity of life; still others simply feel “that any failure to provide beneficial
care reflects a cold-hearted indifference toward human suffering or conflicts
with the moral belief that life and health have priceless value.”115
Although many people find the insulation ideal to be intuitively
appealing,116 it is not a tenable way to guide the distribution of health care.117
Given the rise of expensive medical technology, the amount of money
required to address this ideal would not leave enough resources to provide
other valuable social goods.118 Moreover, even if the United States were to
spend its entire wealth on health care, it still could not afford to provide all
the medical care to every person who would benefit from such care.119 In

112. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 885.
113. Dworkin attributes this position to Rene Descartes and Michael Walzer. Dworkin, Justice
in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 885–86. However, Walzer himself appears to
reject Dworkin’s characterization of his view. See Michael Walzer, ‘Spheres of Justice’: An
Exchange,
N.Y.
REV.
BOOKS,
July
21,
1983,
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1983/07/21/spheres-of-justice-an-exchange/; see also Segall,
supra note 106, at 344 n.9, 345–46 n.14.
114. Elhauge, supra note 111 (citing JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES
92–112 (1977); JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE 28–33 (1985)).
115. Id. (citing GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 32, 39, 49 (1978);
DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 213 (1990)); see
also Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 15, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcare-t.html (“The way we regard
rationing in health care seems to rest on [the] assumption . . . that it’s immoral to apply monetary
considerations to saving lives . . . .”).
116. Elhauge, supra note 111, at 1459 (“Moral absolutism has powerful emotive appeal. Easy
as it may be to reject in the abstract, moral absolutism remains difficult to reject in practice. Indeed,
the persistent power of absolutist beliefs in the face of unending escalation of health care costs is
the most striking moral phenomenon of health law policy in the past quarter-century.”).
117. Id. (“[M]oral absolutism is wholly untenable as a societal system of resource allocation.”).
118. Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS.
55, 58 (1984); Fried, supra note 109, at 31.
119. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Uncomfortable Arithmetic—Whom to
Cover Versus What to Cover, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 95, 97 (2010) (“There is only 100% of Gross
Domestic Product to go around, whereas we could theoretically spend a virtually unlimited
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addition, it is not clear why the insulation ideal should be exclusively
concerned with medical care, rather than with the array of other public health
measures and social determinants of health, given that each of the rough
justifications offered above (e.g., alleviating suffering, preserving the
sanctity of life) seem equally applicable to at least some of these other
measures. Once resource constraints and the importance of other social
goods are acknowledged, the insulation ideal provides no guidance as to how
health care should be allocated.120
2. Fair Equality of Opportunity
The second variant of the Right to Equal Access has been developed by
Norman Daniels, drawing on John Rawls’s general theory of justice as
fairness, and in particular, his principle of “fair equality of opportunity.”121
Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity holds that people’s natural
talents and skills should determine the opportunities (and in particular, the
jobs and offices) available to them.122 This implies not only that there must
be a prohibition on laws that restrict some people’s opportunities (such as
racially discriminatory laws or religious quotas), but also that there must be
affirmative measures (such as education programs) to help correct for past
discriminatory practices and differences in people’s family and social
circumstances that have prevented the development of their talents and
skills.123
Although Rawls himself does not address the implications of his theory
of justice for health care, Daniels argues that health care institutions play an
important role in ensuring fair equality of opportunity.124 This is the case,
amount of money on health care.”); Elhauge, supra note 111, at 1459 (“Most knowledgeable
observers believe we could today easily spend 100% of our GNP on health care without running out
of services that would provide some positive health benefit to some patient.”); Alan Williams,
Priority Setting in Public and Private Health Care: A Guide Through the Ideological Jungle, 7 J.
HEALTH ECON. 173, 173 (1988) (“[N]o country (not even the richest) can afford to carry out all the
potentially beneficial procedures that are now available, on all the people who might possibly
benefit from them.”) (emphasis omitted).
120. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 886 (“Once, however,
this suggestion of the ancient ideal is rejected as incredible, the ideal has nothing more to say. It
has, as it were, no second best or fall-back level of advice. It simply falls silent.”).
121. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 39–48. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
122. RAWLS, supra note 121, at 39–40.
123. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 52–53. Rawls distinguishes the former from fair
equality of opportunity, referring to it as formal equality of opportunity. Id. at 52.
124. Id. at 42–48. To be more specific, for the purposes of developing his theory of justice as
fairness, Rawls makes a simplifying assumption that people “are fully functional over a normal
lifespan,” an assumption which drew criticism that Rawls’s theory was not useful in the real world.
Id. at 47; see Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice,
70 J. PHIL. 245, 251 (1973). Daniels tries to address this criticism by relaxing this assumption and
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Daniels argues, because meeting health needs has an important impact on
equality of opportunity.125 Health, which Daniels describes as “normal
species-functioning,” makes a “significant—if limited—contribution to
protecting the range of opportunities individuals can reasonably exercise.”126
Thus, Daniels maintains that health care is special because it contributes to
maintaining or restoring health, which in turn is necessary to protect fair
equality of opportunity.127 If, as Rawls argues, society has an obligation to
protect the fair equality of opportunity, “then health-care institutions should
be designed to meet that obligation.”128
On this basis, Daniels argues that there must be “universal access, based
on health needs,” to the subset of health care services (which Daniels refers
to as the “basic tier”) that promotes “fair equality of opportunity under
reasonable resource constraints.”129 He writes that “there should be no
obstacles – financial, racial, geographical, and so on – to access the basic
tier” of the system.130 Without such a guarantee, some people’s health
outcomes would be worse than others by no fault of their own, and this would
undermine equality of opportunity.
There are several important differences, however, between Daniels’
account and the insulation ideal. First, Daniels’ account implies that only
certain health care services must be distributed equally on the basis of health
care needs: namely, those health care services in the basic tier that are
necessary for maintaining or restoring normal functioning.131 Daniels’
account thus provides a means of limiting the demands that health care makes

concluding that there is a societal obligation to protect normal functioning. See Norman Daniels,
Capabilities, Opportunity, and Health, in MEASURING JUSTICE: PRIMARY GOODS AND
CAPABILITIES 131, 131–33 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns eds., 2010) [hereinafter Daniels,
Capabilities, Opportunity, and Health]. Rawls, in his later work, endorsed Daniels’ account of the
relationship between health and fair equality of opportunity. Id. at 136.
125. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 45; see also Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health
Care (II): Is Equality Too Much?, 10 THEORETICAL MED. 301, 303 (1989) (“Losing one’s health is
not like losing one’s job. Losing one’s job may result in a temporarily constrained standard of
living. But even in a weak economy one will still have the opportunity to find another job, or create
work for oneself. By way of contrast, loss of health means that virtually all opportunities for life
plans in a normal range are lost or very severely constrained.”).
126. Norman Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, in STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL., 1, 25
(Edward N. Zalta et al., 2017), https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/justicehealthcareaccess/.
127. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 45.
128. Id. at 79.
129. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 143.
130. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 79–80. Although Daniels’ views have
evolved over time, especially early in his career, he clearly committed to a principle of equal access
to the basic tier. Id. at 80 (arguing for “[t]he importance of such equality of access to the basic
tier”).
131. Id. at 53.
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upon societal resources and avoiding the “bottomless pit” objection.132
Although it is not obvious at first glance which services are necessary to
promote normal functioning, Daniels argues that “[h]ealth needs” or “things
we need to maintain normal functioning” are “objectively ascribable,”133 and
that this gives us at least “a crude measure of the relative importance of
meeting different health needs.”134
Second, Daniels acknowledges that there are other important factors that
affect health besides medical care, and that there are other factors besides
health that affect opportunity. In Daniels’ first book outlining his theory, he
defined “health care” broadly to include not just medical care, but also public
health interventions.135 In more recent work, he has also emphasized the role
of social determinants of health, such as early childhood education,
nutritional programs, and economic inequality.136 Likewise, Daniels
acknowledges that there are other factors besides health—he singles out
education in particular—that “are strategically important contributors to fair
equality of opportunity.”137
Third, Daniels acknowledges that given resource constraints and the
importance of these other social goods, we cannot meet everyone’s health
care needs.138 In fact, Daniels argues that “setting limits [on health spending]
is a general requirement of justice, not something we must regrettably do only
in countries with few resources and should resist doing in wealthier ones.”139
He argues that the various institutions that affect fair equality of opportunity
(such as health care and education) “must be weighed against each other,” as
must the resources required to promote opportunity be weighed against other
social goods.140 He also argues that shifting some resources away from
medical care toward the social determinants of health may be appropriate.141
132. Id.
133. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 37.
134. Id. at 45.
135. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at ix.
136. See, e.g., DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 4; Norman Daniels, Bruce Kennedy &
Ichiro Kawachi, Justice Is Good for Our Health, in IS INEQUALITY BAD FOR OUR HEALTH? 3, 25–
31 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000). But see Marcia Angell, Pockets of Poverty, in IS
INEQUALITY BAD FOR OUR HEALTH?, supra, at 42, 45–46 (“[Daniels, Kennedy, and Kawachi] are
on less solid ground in their contention that inequality somehow contributes to poor health directly,
above and beyond the effects of poverty itself. . . . Inequality just seems to be a direct contributor to
poor health, whereas the real cause is poverty.”).
137. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 46.
138. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 63.
139. Id. at 104.
140. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 54.
141. Daniels, Kennedy, & Kawachi, supra note 136, at 25 (“We do not suggest, then, that our
society should immediately reallocate resources away from medicine to schools, for example, in the
hope and expectation that a better-educated population will be healthier. But the arguments here
suggest that some reallocations of resources to improve the social determinants are justifiable.”).

170

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:144

To determine how these goods should be weighed, what services should be
included in the basic tier, and what limits on health spending are appropriate,
Daniels (in collaboration with James Sabin) proposes a procedural solution
to this problem: a “fair deliberative process” to determine how to account for
these resource constraints while still protecting fair equality of
opportunity.142
In sum, Daniels’ account suggests that health care is special because it
is an important contributor to maintaining fair equality of opportunity. This
provides a rationale for why inequality in access to health care must be
limited, which may or may not apply to other goods. His account suggests
that some health care services—those necessary to maintain normal
functioning—must be provided equally and fully. The contents of this “basic
tier” of services must be determined by a fair, deliberative process.
The fair equality of opportunity account has drawn a number of
objections.143 Some critics question the empirical basis for Daniels’
argument that health care is special by arguing that the distribution of health
care has a relatively trivial impact on the distribution of health outcomes.144
Others argue that Daniels’ fair equality of opportunity account cannot justify
health care treatment for elderly patients who have already completed their
life plans.145 Still others argue that Daniels’ account fails to meet the
“leveling down” objection, since “[e]qual unhealth among all people would
be consistent with equal opportunity as well.”146
B. The Right to a Decent Minimum
The accounts of the Right to a Decent Minimum share two common
features: First, they argue that there is a societal obligation to provide access
to some absolute level of health care benefits. This right is grounded in the
notion of “sufficiency,” the idea that what is morally important is that people
have enough, not that some people have more than others.147 Unlike the
Right to Equal Access, the Right to a Decent Minimum does not view it as
142. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 25, 117–39.
143. See Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice: Toward a New Paradigm of
Health Ethics, Policy and Law, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 421–22 (2006) (outlining
several different critiques).
144. See Gopal Sreenivasan, Opportunity Is Not the Key, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1b (2001). But
see, e.g., Deaton, supra note 53, at 269 (“One reason for pinpointing the effects of health care is the
clear importance of health-related innovations for the decline in mortality in the developed world
over the past half century.”).
145. Segall, supra note 106, at 342–43. Segall characterizes Daniels as claiming that “[h]ealth
is strategically important because it contributes significantly to our ability to pursue and realize our
life plans.” Id. at 347.
146. F.M. KAMM, Health and Equality of Opportunity, in BIOETHICAL PRESCRIPTIONS: TO
CREATE, END, CHOOSE, AND IMPROVE LIVES 393, 393–94 (2013).
147. See FRANKFURT, supra note 20.
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problematic if some people have better access to health care than others, as
long as everyone has some basic level of access to the services included in
the decent minimum. In contrast to the insulation ideal, the Right to a Decent
Minimum does not require that everyone have access to all health care
services. In addition, in contrast to the fair equality of opportunity account,
the Right to a Decent Minimum does not require equal access to a basic set
of health care services, only sufficient access.
Second, the accounts of the Right to a Decent Minimum do not view
health care as “special” in the sense that there are special reasons for why it
needs to be distributed more equally than other goods. These accounts do
not view health as being of special moral importance, and the rationales they
offer for why the government should ensure access to a decent minimum of
health care seem applicable to a range of other social benefits.
Because it is not concerned with ensuring equal access to health care,
the Right to a Decent Minimum avoids both the leveling down objection and
the bottomless pit objection. However, the Right to a Decent Minimum faces
a different challenge—that of specifying which services are included in the
decent minimum.148 In addition, the Right to a Decent Minimum must still
justify why society has an obligation to provide access to some level of health
care goods. Although some of these accounts do not explicitly invoke the
language of “rights” at all, they nevertheless each provide justifications for
enacting a legal right to health care.
This Section below focuses on two prominent arguments in favor of the
Right to a Decent Minimum: a prudent insurance ideal and a modified market
account. The prudent insurance ideal stems from a more general theory of
equality of resources developed by Ronald Dworkin, whereas the modified
market account emphasizes maximizing overall welfare through market
mechanisms.
1. The Prudent Insurance Ideal
The first variant is Ronald Dworkin’s “prudent insurance” ideal, which
asserts that we should provide access to the kinds of care for which it would
be prudent for people to purchase insurance coverage, under certain idealized
conditions.149
148. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 74–75; see also FRANKFURT, supra
note 20, at 15 (“Calculating the size of an equal share of something is generally much easier—a
more straightforward and well-defined task—than determining how much a person needs of it in
order to have enough. The very concept of having an equal share is itself considerably more
transparent and intelligible than the concept of having enough. A theory of equality is much easier
to articulate, accordingly, than a theory of sufficiency.”).
149. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 311–13. For another version of the
prudent insurance approach, see Allan Gibbard, The Prospective Pareto Principle and Equity of
Access to Health Care, 60 MILBANK MEM’L FUND Q. HEALTH & SOC’Y 399 (1982).
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Dworkin’s account rests on inquiring how much people would spend to
insure themselves against negative health outcomes under certain idealized
“fair-free market” conditions.150 First, suppose that society provides for an
equal distribution of resources, but that people are free to use those resources
as they see fit to pursue their own life goals. This is part of Dworkin’s more
general egalitarian theory: that we have an obligation to treat each other as
equals, and that the best way to do that is by ensuring equality of resources,
a concept which he develops through imagining an initial auction and
subsequent trading.151 Second, suppose that all information about the value,
side effects, and costs of particular medical procedures are known by the
public. Third, suppose that no one has any information about the “antecedent
probability” of anyone contracting any disease or other health condition.152
Dworkin suggests that under these fair-free market conditions, most
people would choose to purchase health insurance coverage to protect against
the possibility of experiencing certain kinds of conditions.153
He
hypothesizes that individuals might start off by making their own insurance
arrangements, and that over time, these would evolve into “collective
institutions and arrangements.”154 He speculates that insurance companies
might offer a “basic scheme” of insurance coverage that would be “much the
same for everyone.”155
Dworkin argues that in our non-idealized society, we should design our
health care financing system to approximate the system that would develop
under his idealized fair-free market conditions. He justifies this conclusion
by arguing that “a just distribution is one that well-informed people create
for themselves by individual choices, provided that the economic system and
the distribution of wealth in the community in which these choices are made
are themselves just.”156 Therefore, according to Dworkin, the government
should aim to provide everyone with a package of health insurance benefits
that approximates those benefits that most people would choose for
themselves if they were purchasing health insurance under fair-free market
conditions.157

150. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 888–89 (spelling out
these assumptions).
151. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFS. 283 (1981).
152. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 889 (emphasis
omitted).
153. Id. at 889–90.
154. Id. at 890.
155. Id.
156. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 313.
157. See id. at 316–17.
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Although Dworkin acknowledges that we cannot know what individuals
would spend on health care under his idealized conditions “with any
precision,”158 he contends that there are at least a few kinds of procedures
that would certainly cover most people in such a plan, including “standard
prenatal care,” primary care examinations, and inoculations.159 Dworkin also
contends that there are certain kinds of procedures that would definitely not
be covered in the basic plan.160 For example, Dworkin contends that “[i]t
would be irrational for almost any twenty-five-year-old to insure himself as
to provide for life-sustaining treatment if he falls into a persistent vegetative
state.”161 Similarly, he claims that “it would not be prudent” for almost
anyone to pay for insurance coverage for expensive medical intervention
after someone entered the late stages of irreversible dementia.162 He also
ventures that the basic package would likely not include “ultra-expensive
marginal diagnostics or extraordinarily costly treatments that have some but
very little prospects for success.”163
Although Dworkin’s account is an egalitarian one in the sense that it is
concerned with equality generally, it does not require a particular level of
equality in access to health care. Under Dworkin’s account, people may
choose to purchase health insurance beyond the “basic” level of coverage.164
Dworkin explicitly acknowledges that in a just society (as he understands it),
“some people would have better medical care—some people would live
longer and healthier lives—only because they had more money.”165 More
generally, he acknowledges that his “conception of equality will not make
people equal in the amount of money or goods each has at any particular time;
still less will it mean that everyone will lead the same kind of life.”166
Dworkin defends this conception of equality as “dynamic and sensitive to
people’s differing convictions about how to live.”167
Nor does Dworkin appear to think that health care is special, such that
there are special reasons why the distribution of health care in particular
should be equal. Rather, he concedes that his interest in health care is

158. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 889.
159. Id. at 894. But see Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 126, at 33 (“Since
there is no feasible way to meet the assumptions about the distribution of medical knowledge or the
exclusion of knowledge of individual risks, these assumptions make Dworkin’s argument
completely hypothetical and theoretical rather than practical.”).
160. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 891.
161. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 313.
162. Id. at 314.
163. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 896.
164. Id. at 890.
165. Id. at 896.
166. Id. at 888.
167. Id. at 898.
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“largely practical,” driven by the fact that there is more middle- and upperclass interest in health care and that Americans are more open to government
involvement in health care than in other areas.168 Dworkin suggests that he
views health care reform as a means of promoting equality of resources more
generally, rather than thinking there are special reasons to promote an equal
distribution of health care.169
2. The Modified Market Account
A second prominent account of the Right to a Decent Minimum is what
has been referred to as the “modified market account.”170 This view first
came to the fore in the early 1970s,171 and has been incredibly influential. In
particular, it influenced the structure and development of the 2010 Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.172 This view has two main parts: First,
it supports the provision of a decent minimum of health care on the grounds
that doing so will improve overall welfare; and second, it implies that the
most efficient (i.e., welfare-enhancing) way to provide a decent minimum is
through market mechanisms.173
This account emphasizes market mechanisms because it explains the
demand for health care in terms of “preferences,” rather than needs, and so it
treats health care like any other commodity.174 Thus, market mechanisms are
viewed as necessary to deliver health care benefits since they are the best
means of enabling people to satisfy their own health care preferences.175
Another implication of this view is that it does not object to inequalities in
access to health care, but rather views such inequalities “merely as the
expression of different preference curves, just as food budgets might vary
among a welfare recipient, a factory worker, and a wealthy industrialist.”176
That being said, the modified market account does not leave health care
completely to the free market; it acknowledges that some forms of
government intervention or subsidies are necessary to correct for market

168. Id. at 897.
169. Id. at 897–98.
170. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 249.
171. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED.
155, 156 (2004).
172. See Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1926, 1931
(2019). Norman Daniels characterizes the modified market account as “not really a position
represented in the empirical literature on access . . . [but rather] a composite abstracted from views
which are common in economics and health planning literature.” DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE,
supra note 3, at 71.
173. See generally ENTHOVEN, supra note 25.
174. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 71–72; Rosenblatt, supra note 171, at 176.
175. See Hoffman, supra note 172, at 1932–33.
176. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 73.
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failures, such as informational or financial barriers, that would otherwise
prevent access to a decent minimum.177
How does the provision of a decent minimum maximize societal
welfare? One possible answer is that health insurance—like wealth and
income—has diminishing marginal utility, so that providing a basic level of
benefits is an efficient means of maximizing health benefits.178 Yet this still
leaves a puzzle unanswered: If health care is just a commodity, then why not
just provide cash vouchers and let people choose for themselves which
commodities to purchase? Indeed, economic orthodoxy suggests that
providing cash transfers would be a much more efficient means of improving
welfare than providing in-kind benefits like health insurance coverage.179
Economists have offered a number of possible justifications for why
governments nevertheless frequently choose to offer in-kind benefits, and
why they often choose to provide health care benefits in particular.180 One
justification is that people simply have a preference for redistributive policies
when it comes to health care, so that ensuring a basic level of access to health
care makes everyone happier.181 A second justification is that providing
177. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 109, at 33 (“What if, instead, each person were assured a certain
amount of money to purchase medical services as he chose?”).
178. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, For and Against Equal Access to Health Care, 59 MILBANK
MEM’L FUND Q. HEALTH & SOC’Y 542, 549 (1981) (“Several defenders of the market as a means
of allocating goods and services also support a moderate degree of income redistribution on grounds
of its diminishing marginal utility, or because they believe that every person has a right to a ‘basic
minimum.’”); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in
Public Expenditures, 85 Q.J. ECON. 409, 409 (1971). But see FRANKFURT, supra note 20, at 17–40
(arguing that regarding income and wealth, the principle of diminishing marginal utility depends on
false assumptions).
179. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health Care Be Left to the Market?, 26 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 967, 978 (2001) (“While elementary justice seems to require greater equality in
the distribution of medical care, the question is complicated by the fact that the poor suffer
deprivation in many directions. Economic theory suggests it might be better to redistribute income
and allow the poor to decide which additional goods and services they wish to buy.”) (citation
omitted); Mark V. Pauly, Valuing Health Care in Money Terms, in VALUING HEALTH CARE: COSTS
BENEFITS, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND OTHER MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
117 (Frank A. Sloan ed., 1995) (“If we want to provide benefit to low-income people, a more
efficient approach would be to use the money that would have been spent on the program [as
opposed to making] a direct money transfer to them, since the money will benefit low-income
people more than the program would.”).
180. See generally Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets
the Data, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 333 (2008) (reviewing various theoretical explanations for in-kind
transfers and the empirical evidence supporting such theories).
181. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 954 (1963) (“[T]here is a more general interdependence, the concern of individuals
for the health of others. The economic manifestations of this taste are to be found in individual
donations to hospitals and to medical education, as well as in the widely accepted responsibilities
of government in this area. The taste for improving the health of others appears to be stronger than
for improving other aspects of their welfare.”); Mark Shepard, Katherine Baicker & Jonathan S.
Skinner, Does One Medicare Fit All? The Economics of Uniform Health Insurance Benefits 8 (Nat’l
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health benefits has positive externalities: the benefits of providing health
insurance extend beyond the insured. This may be because, for example,
universal access to health care reduces the spread of communicable
diseases,182 or makes the labor force more productive.183 A third justification
is paternalism: Many people prefer in-kind benefits out of a concern that if
the poor were given cash vouchers, then they would fail to spend the vouchers
appropriately.184
One challenge to the modified market account is that because it is
grounded in utilitarianism, it does not actually justify providing the decent
minimum to everyone.185 In particular, Allen Buchanan suggests that
utilitarianism would not justify providing the decent minimum to people with
physical or mental conditions that will render the costs of the minimum
greater than their contribution to social utility.186
*

*

*

Although this Article focuses on the four accounts described above,
these are by no means the only possible accounts of the Right to Equal Access
and the Right to a Decent Minimum. For instance, Amy Gutmann suggests
that the values of equal efforts to relieve pain and equal respect would also
support a principle of equal access to health care.187 Another prominent
variant of the Right to Equal Access stems from Amartya Sen’s and Martha
Nussbaum’s influential work on capabilities. Capabilities, as Sen and
Nussbaum define them, are “what people are actually able to do and to be.”188

Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26472, 2019) (suggesting that most countries use inkind transfers because of an “egalitarian social preference for health”).
182. Elhauge, supra note 111, at 1480–81.
183. Walter McClure, Alain C. Enthoven & Tim McDonald, Universal Health Coverage?
Why?,
HEALTH
AFFS.
(July
25,
2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170725.061210/full/.
184. See generally Zachary Liscow & Abigail Pershing, Why Is So Much Redistribution In-Kind
and Not in Cash? Evidence from a Survey Experiment (Oct. 2020), (unpublished manuscript)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3672415 (conducting a survey experiment and
finding that respondents’ preferences for in-kind redistribution were primarily driven by
paternalistic concerns).
185. Buchanan, supra note 118, at 60.
186. Id.
187. Gutmann, supra note 178, at 548.
188. Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9
FEMINIST ECON. 33, 33 (2003). According to Sen, “[a] person’s ‘capability’ refers to the alternative
combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve.” AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT
AS FREEDOM 75 (2000). Functionings, in turn, represent “the various things a person may value
doing or being,” ranging from being free from disease to participating in the community. Id. In
other words, capabilities represent a form of liberty: the liberty to achieve different lifestyles. Id. at
74; Amartya Sen, Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Delivered at Stanford University: Equality of
What?, 217–19 (May 22, 1979).
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Understood in this way, people are equal when they have the same capability
sets.189 Although the precise relation between capabilities and health is
disputed,190 the capabilities approach treats health care with special moral
importance and justifies some degree of equality in access to health care
services.191
In practice, it is not clear how much these other variants of the Right to
Equal Access differ from the fair equality of opportunity account. It seems
plausible that an account of the Right to Equal Access that is focused on
efforts to relieve pain or support equal conditions of self-respect might
require equal access to a broader range of health care services than necessary
to ensure fair equality of opportunity.192 Likewise, some proponents of the
capabilities approach claim it requires a more robust level of equality than
the fair equality of opportunity account,193 though Daniels himself suggests
189. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 39–55 (1992). Of note, equality of capabilities
does not, however, require equality of all capabilities. As Elizabeth Anderson puts it, “[b]eing a
poor card player does not make one oppressed.” Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of
Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 317 (1999). Instead, Sen calls for equality of what he refers to as “basic
capabilities,” which are “prerequisites to other capabilities.” Jennifer Prah Ruger, Toward a Theory
of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMANS.
273, 302, 302 n.119 (2006). Sen himself does not provide a full list of these capabilities, but he
specifically mentions “[t]he ability to move about . . . the ability to meet one’s nutritional
requirements, the wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered, [and] the power to participate in the
social life of the community.” Sen, supra note 188, at 218. Nussbaum provides a more
comprehensive list of ten “Central Human Capabilities,” which she claims are “central requirements
of a life with dignity.” Nussbaum, supra note 188, at 40.
190. Nussbaum includes the capability of “[b]odily [h]ealth,” which she defines as “[b]eing able
to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate
shelter,” on her list of the ten Central Human Capabilities. Id. at 41. Others have distinguished
between “central” and “non-central health capabilities,” the former of which are “prerequisites for
other capabilities.” Ruger, supra note 189, at 302. Yet others have argued that health in itself is
not a capability, but that some level of health is actually necessary for all ten of Nussbaum’s
capabilities. Per-Anders Tengland, Health and Capabilities: A Conceptual Clarification, 23 MED.,
HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 25, 25 (2020).
191. Jennifer Prah Ruger writes that the capabilities approach necessitates reducing disparities
in access to health care because “unequal access can reduce individuals’ capability to function.”
JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, A Health Capability Account of Equal Access, in HEALTH AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 144 (2009). Thus, the capabilities approach “requires society to ensure social conditions,
goods, and services in proportion to individuals’ and groups’ health needs, as determined by the
requirements each individual or group has to achieve their potential in health.” Id. at 141.
192. Gutmann, supra note 178, at 547.
193. RUGER, supra note 191. More generally, Sen and Nussbaum argue that the capabilities
approach is preferable to the Rawlsian emphasis on equality of resources both because the latter
“fetishizes” resources over human beings, and because the capabilities approach accounts for the
fact that people have different needs for resources depending on their individual circumstances.
Thus, the same set of resources will not necessarily make people equally well off in terms of what
they can do or be. Sen, supra note 188, at 215–16; Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and
Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202, 233 (1992). For
instance, a mobility-impaired person will need more resources to attain the same level of mobility
as a person without such an impairment. Sen, supra note 188, at 215. That being said, the extent
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that the two accounts largely converge, at least once Rawls’s theory is
extended to health and health care in the way he proposes.194
There are other justifications that can be offered for the Right to a
Decent Minimum as well. For instance, Allen Buchanan concludes that no
single theory of justice can provide an adequate foundation for a universal
Right to a Decent Minimum.195 Instead, he makes a pluralistic case for a
legal entitlement to health care that stems from the combined weight of
multiple moral considerations,196 together with an argument for what he
terms “[e]nforced [b]eneficence.”197 Henry Shue justifies the right to a
decent minimum of health care services as part of a category of “basic rights”
that are necessary to realize other rights, such as the right to free assembly.198
These accounts may differ in terms of how they determine the contents of the
decent minimum.
The various accounts of the Right to Equal Access and Right to a Decent
Minimum differ both in the types of assumptions and arguments that they
to which Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach differs from Rawls’s theory of justice more
generally is disputed. Rawls himself appeared to view his theory as capturing the importance of
capabilities. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 50 n.29 (“[T]he account of primary
goods does take into account, and does not abstract from, basic capabilities: namely, the capabilities
of citizens as free and equal persons in virtue of their two moral powers.”) (citation omitted).
194. Daniels, Capabilities, Opportunity, and Health, supra note 124, at 134.
195. Buchanan, supra note 118, at 59.
196. Buchanan outlines three different moral considerations in support of a Right to a Decent
Minimum. Id. at 67–68. First, he argues that certain groups have “special” (as opposed to universal)
rights to a decent minimum: groups who have experienced a history of prejudice and discriminatory
treatment that has affected their health (such as Black Americans and Native Americans); groups
whose health has been unjustly affected by unjust treatment by private parties (such as people
sickened by a corporation dumping toxic pollutants); and groups who have made special sacrifices
for the good of society, such as veterans. Id. at 67. Second, he argues that the principle of harm
prevention, which has been invoked to support public health interventions generally, should provide
the same protections across racial and geographic groups. Id. at 67–68. Third, he outlines a few
“prudential arguments” in favor of providing health care, such as improving the productivity of the
labor force and ensuring the fitness of the citizenry for national defense. Id. at 68. Buchanan argues
that the combined weight of these considerations supports a legal entitlement to a decent minimum
of health care for at least certain groups, perhaps the groups that we are most concerned about
lacking health care. Id.
197. Id. Buchanan articulates two arguments for what he calls “enforced beneficence.” Both
arguments assume that there is a moral obligation of beneficence to provide help to people in need,
and that this includes the provision of at least certain forms of health care. Id. at 69. However,
Buchanan argues that even if one grants the assumption that people will act on these charitable
obligations, there are certain forms of beneficence—such as health care—that can only be provided
through the contributions of large numbers of people, and that legal enforcement is necessary to
achieve such coordinated joint efforts. Id. at 70.
198. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
22–25 (1980) (describing the right to “minimal preventive public health care” as part of broader
“right to subsistence” which is a “basic right” necessary to realize other rights); see also James W.
Nickel, Linkage Arguments For and Against Rights, OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming)
(explaining how these types of “Justificatory Linkage Arguments” can be used to support—and
attack—rights claims).
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rely on as well as their implications in terms of what the right to health care
implies. Broadly, the accounts of the Right to Equal Access all support some
level of equality in access to health care services, yet they vary in terms of
whether all health care services must be distributed equally, or only some
subset. By contrast, the accounts of the Right to a Decent Minimum all
support the right to some basic level of health care benefits and do not object
to inequalities in health care access, yet they suggest different approaches to
determining the basic minimum. As I will show in Part III, these different
approaches lead to distinct practical implications for health care reform.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND COMPARISONS
This Part first examines the implications of the two conceptions of the
right to health care with respect to the three key policy issues described
above: what health care benefits should be covered, whether cost-sharing is
appropriate, and whether private health insurance should be preserved. Then,
it compares these theoretical implications to the actual approaches taken by
Medicare for All and the incremental plans.
Making these comparisons helps to illuminate the normative
underpinnings of the debate over health care reform, and to understand some
of the most salient differences between Medicare for All and the incremental
reforms. Yet it also reveals that there are surprising areas of convergence
between the two theoretical conceptions of the right to health care, and
accordingly, that there is room for greater convergence between the two types
of reform proposals. In addition, it reveals that in at least one important
respect, both types of reforms fall short of the perspective of either
conception of the right to health care.
A. Theoretical Implications
I begin by examining the implications of the Right to Equal Access and the
Right to a Decent Minimum with regard to the three aforementioned policy
issues. Although these two conceptions largely converge when it comes to
the issue of covered benefits, they diverge with regard to cost-sharing and
private health insurance (see Table 1 below). These divergent implications
stem from their different views about inequalities in health care access: The
Right to Equal Access views at least some kinds of inequality in health care
access as inherently objectionable, whereas the Right to a Decent Minimum
does not. However, the different versions of these conceptions of the right
to health care do not have uniform implications. For instance, although all
the accounts of the Right to Equal Access would restrict the provision of
private health insurance and cost-sharing to some degree, the individual
accounts of this right differ in terms of just how strictly they would do so.
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Table 1: Theoretical Implications for Key Policy Issues in Health Care
Reform
The Right to Equal Access

The Right to a Decent
Minimum

Insulation
Ideal

Fair Equality of
Opportunity

Prudent
Insurance
Ideal

Modified
Market
Account

Reasonable
limits on
covered
benefits?

None

Yes
(accountability
for
reasonableness)

Yes
(imprudent
purchases)

Yes (e.g., costeffectiveness)

CostSharing?

None

Yes, outside of
the basic tier

Yes

Yes

Private
health
insurance?

None

Yes, with
restrictions

Yes

Yes

1. Covered Benefits
Perhaps surprisingly, it is not clear that the Right to Equal Access
necessarily justifies covering a broader set of health care benefits than the
Right to a Decent Minimum. Because the accounts of the Right to a Decent
Minimum are not particularly specific regarding which benefits would be
included in the “decent minimum,”199 it is at least possible to imagine a
decent minimum of health care benefits that is comparable to the benefits
covered under the Right to Equal Access.200
Moreover, three out of the four accounts of the right to health care (all
except for the insulation ideal) suggest that a just distribution of health care
is not only compatible with imposing reasonable limitations on covered

199. Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1021 (1997) (“Close examination of even the most systematic
approaches to specifying adequate care demonstrates that each of them is, at the most fundamental
level, wholly indeterminate.”).
200. Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 126, at 40–41 (noting that
“Dworkin’s prudential insurance approach might have the same scope as the opportunity-based
view if the insurance policy that (most?) prudent buyers purchase includes protections against health
risks that go beyond treatments for illness”).

2021]

EQUALITY AND SUFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE REFORM

181

health care benefits, but it in fact requires imposing such limitations.201 This
follows from the fact that, in a society with limited resources, public
financing of health care benefits has opportunity costs: Any decision about
covering health care benefits will leave less money to pay for other important
social goods, such as education, transportation, and housing.202 This in turn
implies that a just health care system must place some reasonable limits on
the amount of health care spending.203
The Right to Equal Access
Of all the versions of the right to health care described in Part II, only
the insulation ideal suggests that there is no need to set limits on covered
benefits. The insulation ideal suggests that every kind of medical care that
contributes at all to people’s health should be covered, no matter the cost, and
no matter how minimal the benefits.204 While this ideal may be intuitively
appealing to many people,205 it is especially vulnerable to the bottomless pit
objection, since attempting to satisfy it would leave no resources for other
important social goods, such as education, transportation, housing, or
national defense.206 Therefore, as discussed above, the insulation ideal is not
a realistic principle to guide a just distribution of health care.
By contrast, the fair equality of opportunity account provides that a just
distribution of health care must include limits on covered services, and in
particular that it must weigh health care benefits against other social goods.207
This is true for a couple of reasons: First, insofar as the special importance of
health care derives from its impact on health, non-medical services such as
public health, education, and housing arguably contribute more to health than

201. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 104 (“[S]etting limits is a general
requirement of justice, not something we must regrettably do only in countries with few resources
and should resist doing in wealthier ones.”); DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 315
(“If we substituted the prudent insurance approach for the rescue principle as our abstract ideal of
justice in health care, we would therefore accept certain limits on universal coverage, and we would
accept these not as compromises with justice but as required by it.”).
202. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Do We Spend Too Much on Health Care?,
383 N. ENG. J. MED. 605, 607 (2020).
203. Gopal Sreenivasan, Why Justice Requires Rationing in Health Care, in MEDICINE, CARE,
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH CARE 143, 144 (Rosamond
Rhodes et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Sreenivasan, Why Justice Requires Rationing in Health Care].
204. See supra notes 111–120 and accompanying text.
205. See David C. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness Meets
the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218, 2219 (1991) (“[T]here is a fact about the human psyche that
will inevitably trump the utilitarian rationality that is implicit in cost-effectiveness analysis: people
cannot stand idly by when an identified person’s life is visibly threatened if effective rescue
measures are available.”)
206. See supra note 109.
207. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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health care does.208 Second, the claim that health care is morally distinctive
does not imply that it is the only important social good—or even the most
important one.209
The fair equality of opportunity account attempts to address the
bottomless pit objection by articulating a limitation on covered health care
benefits: It provides that there must be equal access to a “basic” tier of
benefits, based on health needs, that are “needed to maintain, restore, or
compensate for the loss of normal species-typical functioning.”210 In earlier
work, Daniels argued that this at least provides a “principled” approach,
albeit an “abstract” one, of carving out certain benefits to which there would
not be guaranteed access.211 In more recent work, Daniels (together with
James Sabin) has developed a procedural method, called “accountability for
reasonableness,” for determining what types of benefits would be included in
the basic tier.212 This process emphasizes “that the rationales for
important . . . plan decisions should not only be publicly available, but should
also be those that ‘fair-minded’ people can agree are relevant to pursuing
appropriate patient care under necessary resource constraints.”213
The Right to a Decent Minimum
The different variants of the Right to a Decent Minimum suggest a few
different ways that the incremental proposals might determine which benefits
to cover. Dworkin’s prudent insurance ideal suggests that the contents of the
basic package would include those services for which most people would
purchase insurance coverage, under the three “fair free market conditions”
that he outlines.214 As discussed above, he argues that this process would

208. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 111, at 1460 (“The need for making tradeoffs is further
underscored by studies showing that income, environment, sanitary housing, and good nutrition
result in larger health improvements per expenditure than health care does.”).
209. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 104 (“Opportunity is also not the only
important social good. Basic liberties must also be protected, including institutions that assure
people that they can effectively exercise them, especially their right of political participation.”).
210. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 79.
211. See id.
212. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 143–44 (“Determining what is in that basic
tier must be clarified in light of arguments about how to protect fair equality of opportunity under
reasonable resource constraints; these arguments require a fair process (accountability for
reasonableness) for appropriate democratic deliberation.”) (citation omitted). See generally
Norman Daniels & James Sabin, The Ethics of Accountability in Managed Care Reform, 17 HEALTH
AFFS. 50, 51 (1998) (developing the concept of “accountability for reasonableness”).
213. Id. at 51.
214. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 315 (“If most prudent people would buy
a certain level of medical coverage in a free market if they had average means—if nearly everyone
would buy insurance covering ordinary medical care, hospitalization when necessary, prenatal and
pediatric care, and regular checkups and other preventive medicine, for example—then the
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likely exclude certain services, such as “extraordinarily costly treatments that
have some but very little prospects for success.”215 Dworkin argues that this
is the case because most young people would likely “think it wiser to spend
what that insurance would cost on better health care earlier, or on education
or training or investment that would provide greater benefit or more
important security.”216
By contrast, some proponents of the modified market approach have
suggested determining the content of the decent minimum by either simply
listing the types of services that would be covered or by appealing to an
average level of services in the current health care system.217 Both of these
approaches are more administratively simple than resorting to a procedure,
but they are arbitrary: they raise the question of why these services, and not
others, should be included in the basic minimum.218 Appealing to an average
means that the contents of the decent minimum will reflect unnecessary or
wasteful features of the current health care system, and exclude any features
that are typically not covered, but which may still be quite valuable.219 In
addition, these approaches do not actually provide an effective means of
limiting health care spending.220 As Einer Elhauge observes, “any list that
simply limits the categories of services funded does nothing to limit
expenditures on care within the funded categories.”221 Faced with such a list,
pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers, and hospitals will
simply focus on delivering expensive drugs, treatments, and technologies that
fall into the specified categories.222
A less arbitrary and more effective method would be to employ either
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), which weighs the costs and benefits of
particular treatments, or comparative effectiveness research (CER), which
weighs the relative efficacy of the treatment being considered compared to

unfairness of our society is almost certainly the reason some people do not have such coverage now.
A universal health-care system should make sure, in all justice, that everyone does have it.”).
215. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 896.
216. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 314.
217. See, e.g., ENTHOVEN, supra note 25; see also DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at
250 (“[P]roponents of the market view shy away from developing a full justification of the focus on
a decent minimum, perhaps because doing so may undercut the idea that health care is a commodity
like any other.”).
218. See Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 126, at 19–20 (“It is typical of
such appeals to lists that there is no rationale offered for why items are on the list. If mental health
services are included, we are often not told which ones; and there may be categorical omissions,
such as dental care, without explanation.”).
219. Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, at 20.
220. Elhauge, supra note 111, at 1470–71.
221. Id. at 1471 (emphasis added).
222. Id.

184

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:144

other treatments.223 Although CEA and CER may call to mind top-down
bureaucratic rationing, some proponents argue that these methods can be
implemented in such a way as to improve the market for health care by
addressing informational problems and misaligned incentives, thereby
enabling patients and providers to make better decisions.224 Adopting either
approach would be in line with the modified market approach’s objective of
maximizing welfare, though it would raise a host of other moral, pragmatic,
and political objections.225
2. Cost-Sharing
The Right to Equal Access and the Right to a Decent Minimum have
divergent implications when it comes to cost-sharing: whereas the Right to
Equal Access requires greatly restricting the use of cost-sharing, the Right to
a Decent Minimum does not. In brief, this is because the Right to Equal
Access is concerned with limiting inequality in access to health care services,
whereas the Right to a Decent Minimum is only focused on providing some
access to a decent minimum of health care services. The Right to Equal
Access views at least some forms of inequality in access to health care as
intrinsically objectionable, even if the public has access to a decent
minimum.
The Right to Equal Access
Although both variants of the Right to Equal Access imply the need for
strict limits on cost-sharing, they have slightly different implications. The
insulation ideal implicitly prohibits any amount of cost-sharing that would
impede access to health care because it forbids any restrictions on access to

223. Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 134.
224. See, e.g., Amitabh Chandra, Anupam B. Jena & Jonathan S. Skinner, The Pragmatist’s
Guide to Comparative Effectiveness Research, J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring 2011, at 27, 42; Russell
Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral Law and
Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 527–28 (2014).
225. See, e.g., DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 114 (“Unfortunately, [costeffectiveness analysis] carries with it some morally controversial — and, many insist, unacceptable
— assumptions.”) (citations omitted); Jerome Groopman, Health Care: Who Knows ‘Best’?, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Feb. 11, 2020, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/02/11/health-care-whoknows-best/ (“Over the past decade, federal ‘choice architects’—i.e., doctors and other experts
acting for the government and making use of research on comparative effectiveness—have
repeatedly identified ‘best practices,’ only to have them shown to be ineffective or even
deleterious.”); Hadorn, supra note 205, at 2225 (“[T]he use of cost-effectiveness analysis is unlikely
to produce a socially or politically acceptable definition of necessary care.”); Sharona Hoffman &
Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes Through Personalized Comparisons of
Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records, 39 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 425, 427–28
(2011) (expressing concerns that both CEA and CER may lead providers to pursue treatments that
are not suitable for individual patients).
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health care that promote health “on grounds of economy.”226 Thus, out-ofpocket costs could be charged for health care only on the condition that they
did not deter anyone’s access to care.227 Since even very small amounts of
cost-sharing—such as copayments of $1 or $5—have been shown to lead
patients to delay seeking necessary medical services, the insulation ideal
would require dramatically scaling back—if not completely eliminating—
cost-sharing.228
By contrast, the fair equality of opportunity account would restrict costsharing only for the “basic tier” of health care services that are necessary for
promoting fair equality of opportunity.229 For services included in the basic
tier, cost-sharing would be restricted since it would create inequalities in
opportunity.230 The intuition underlying this conclusion is simple: Costsharing creates financial barriers to accessing health care, which
disproportionately affect the sick (who have greater need for health care) and
the poor (who are least able to afford it).231 Cost-sharing places these
populations in a bind: They may choose to defer or forgo seeking medical
care, which may detrimentally affect their health.232 Alternatively, if they
fail to cut back on medical care, then they will face disproportionate financial

226. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
227. Gutmann, supra note 178, at 544.
228. See Samantha Artiga, Petry Ubri & Julia Zur, The Effects of Premiums and Cost Sharing
on Low-Income Populations: Updated Review of Research Findings, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 4 (June
1, 2017), https://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Effects-of-Premiums-and-Cost-Sharingon-Low-Income-Populations.
229. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 79–80; DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note
17, at 143–44.
230. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 80 (“[T]he basic tier is defined by
reference to the impact of health-care services on opportunity, and inequalities of opportunity are
not to be tolerated for the sorts of economic reasons that might make the preservation of these
obstacles appealing.”).
231. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 259; Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 135–36.
232. Some empirical research suggests that low-income and sicker populations are more likely
to cut back on medical care in response to cost-sharing than high-income populations, though there
is not a clear consensus. See Artiga et al., supra note 228, at 4 (“Some studies find that lowerincome individuals are more likely to reduce their use of services, including essential services, than
higher-income individuals.”); Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing and
Healthcare Spending Growth, J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring 2011, at 47, 58 (“There is some evidence
that the frequent users of health care (the sickest) are more likely to adjust utilization in response to
changes in cost-sharing. . . . Overall, the evidence to support the contention that low-income groups
are more price sensitive is suggestive, but seems less than fully reliable.”) (citation omitted); Samuel
L. Dickman et al., Health Spending for Low-, Middle- and High-Income Americans, 1963-2012, 35
HEALTH AFFS. 1189, 1195 (2016) (suggesting that the fact that wealthy Americans have higher
medical expenditures than the poorest Americans, despite being in better health, likely reflects—at
least in part—the disproportionate impact that cost-sharing has on poor people’s access to health
care); HAMEL ET AL., supra note 42, at 2 (finding that three-quarters of those in the highestdeductible plans who say that someone in their family has a chronic condition report that a family
member has forgone or delayed medical care over the previous year due to concerns about cost).
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burdens compared to healthy and high-income populations.233 For services
outside of the basic tier, some amount of cost-sharing would presumably be
acceptable.
The Right to a Decent Minimum
By contrast, neither of the variants of the Right to a Decent Minimum
would eliminate cost-sharing. Although Dworkin does not explicitly address
the issue of cost-sharing, he acknowledges that under the prudent insurance
ideal, “some people would have better medical care—some people would
live longer and healthier lives—only because they had more money.”234 He
notes that “some people would be able and willing to make provision for
queue-jumping, or elective cosmetic surgery, or other benefits that the basic
provision made available through general collective schemes would not
provide.”235 This suggests that not only is the prudent insurance ideal
consistent with some people having access to a broader set of health care
benefits than those provided under the public scheme, but that it is also
compatible with some people having better access to the same benefits
provided by the public scheme—which would be the case if the public
scheme had greater cost-sharing requirements.
Likewise, the modified market account supports some level of costsharing. Indeed, the very notion of cost-sharing derives from the market view
of health care as a commodity like cars or televisions.236 According to this
view, health insurance artificially lowers the cost of health care, and in doing
so, creates “moral hazard,” causing people to consume health care services
that they do not value sufficiently to justify the costs of providing that care.237
In theory, cost-sharing presents a solution to this problem by requiring
patients (who are often referred to in this context as “consumers”) to pay a
portion of their health care costs out-of-pocket so that they will have more of

233. See Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber & Robin McKnight, The Impact of Patient CostSharing on Low-Income Populations: Evidence from Massachusetts, 33 J. HEALTH ECON. 57, 65
(2014) (finding that “those who are chronically ill, and especially those with diabetes, high
cholesterol and asthma, have a lower price elasticity of demand”).
234. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 896.
235. Id. at 890.
236. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 19 (“In general, the extensive use of costsharing suggests that many legislators, employers, and plan administrators believe that mechanisms
for marketing other commodities are also appropriate for health care; that is, they believe that health
care may not be as special as some think it should be.”).
237. See generally Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AMER. ECON.
REV. 531 (1968); Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL.
ECON. 251 (1973); see also Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?,
J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 1992, at 3, 15.
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an incentive to not seek low-value health care.238 In practice, however, costsharing has not had this intended effect: Instead of prompting patients to
become smarter health care “consumers,” recent empirical research finds that
cost-sharing in fact causes people to cut back indiscriminately on both lowand high-value care.239 To address this problem, some market-oriented health
scholars have endorsed “Value-Based Insurance Design,” which “aligns
patients’ out-of-pocket costs with the value of services.”240
3. Private Insurance
The Right to Equal Access and the Right to a Decent Minimum also
diverge when it comes to private health insurance: The former supports
restrictions on private health insurance to limit inequalities in access to health
care, whereas the latter only supports such restrictions as necessary to
preserve access to the decent minimum. Again, in essence this is because the
Right to Equal Access is concerned with limiting inequality in health care
access, whereas the Right to a Decent Minimum is only focused on providing
access to a decent minimum.
The Right to Equal Access
The Right to Equal Access restricts private health insurance because it
contributes to inequalities in access to health care. Allowing private health
insurance may contribute to inequalities in health care access in two ways:
First, it does so directly because different health insurance plans may provide
different levels—or “tiers”—of access to health care.241 For instance,
wealthier people may obtain supplemental coverage that provides access to
benefits that are not offered by the public scheme, or they may purchase
private insurance that provides faster access to health care services (i.e.,
shorter wait times) or a broader network of providers.242
Second, allowing private health insurance may indirectly contribute to
inequalities in health care access by undermining the provision of benefits in

238. See Hoffman, supra note 172, at 1970; John A. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks
in the Foundation, 32 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 759, 760–61 (2007).
239. See Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg et al., What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of CostSharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics, 132 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1261
(2017).
240. See, e.g., Haley Richardson et al., V-BID X: Creating a Value-Based Insurance Design Plan
for
the
Exchange
Market,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(July
15,
2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190714.437267/full/.
241. See Benjamin J. Krohmal & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Access and Ability to Pay: The Ethics of
a Tiered Health Care System, 167 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 433, 433 (2007) (distinguishing between
the number of payers in a health care system and the number of tiers).
242. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 72, at 12.
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the public plan.243 This could happen because of the economic effects of
private health insurance.244 For instance, if private plans offer higher
reimbursement rates (as is currently the case in the United States),245 then
providers may prioritize patients with access to private insurance over those
enrolled in the public scheme.246 Alternatively, the provision of private
health insurance could undermine the political sense of solidarity essential
for maintaining the resources necessary for the public plan.247 Such
consequences are not inevitable, however.248 Indeed, it is possible that
allowing private health insurance could actually improve the public plan. For
instance, if private insurance plans selectively contract with higher-quality
providers, this could encourage providers to improve their quality
generally.249
Although both variants of the Right to Equal Access would restrict all
private health insurance, they differ in terms of their rationales and just how
strictly they would do so. The insulation ideal would—at least in theory—
create a one-tier system of infinite generosity, where everyone would have
access to any medical service that provided any health benefit. Under such a
system, there would be no need for wealthier people to purchase private
insurance coverage, since the public plan would guarantee full access to
medical care for everyone based on their health needs.250

243. See Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 126, at 52.
244. See Norman Daniels, Symposium on the Rationing of Health Care: 2 Rationing Medical
Care — A Philosopher’s Perspective on Outcomes and Process, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 27, 33 (1998).
245. MATTHEW FIEDLER, USC-BROOKINGS SCHAEFFER INITIATIVE FOR HEALTH POL’Y,
CAPPING PRICES OR CREATING A PUBLIC OPTION: HOW WOULD THEY CHANGE WHAT WE PAY
FOR HEALTH CARE? 1 (Nov. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/PriceCaps-and-Public-Options-Paper.pdf (“Commercial health insurers pay much higher prices for
health care services than public insurance programs like Medicare or Medicaid.”).
246. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 72, at 13 (“If providers were allowed to participate in
both the single-payer system and the substitutive insurance market and if provider payment rates in
the substitutive insurance plan were higher than in the single-payer system, providers might
prioritize treating those enrollees. If many people enrolled in substitutive insurance, patients in the
single-payer health plan might have longer wait times.”); Gutmann, supra note 178, at 552
(“Without restricting the free market in extra health care goods, a society risks having its best
medical practitioners drained into the private market sector, thereby decreasing the quality of
medical care received by the majority of citizens confined to the publicly funded sector. The lower
the level of public provision of health care and the less elastic the supply of physicians, the more
problematic (from the perspective of the values underlying equal access) will be an additional
market sector in health care.”); Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 136 (“Duplicative insurance
could . . . induce further inequities in care if providers exited the public system or gave priority to
privately insured patients.”).
247. Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 126, at 52; Krohmal & Emanuel,
supra note 241, at 434.
248. Gutmann, supra note 178, at 553 (describing such effects as “empirically contingent”).
249. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 72, at 13.
250. Gutmann, supra note 178, at 544.
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The fair equality of opportunity principle, on the other hand, is
compatible with some forms of private health insurance.251 This is because
the fair equality of opportunity account does not require complete equality in
access to health care, since not all forms of health care contribute to
opportunity.252 Still, Norman Daniels specifies two constraints that the fair
equality of opportunity principle imposes on private insurance: First, private
plans must not undermine the public plan so that it still “protects normal
functioning as much as possible under resource constraints.”253 The public
plan must provide universal and equal access, based on health needs, to the
subset of health care services that promote fair equality of opportunity under
reasonable resource constraints (what Daniels refers to as the “basic tier”).254
Second, Daniels writes that “the structure of inequality that
results . . . [must not be] objectionable.”255 In particular, he suggests that it
would be more morally objectionable if the public plan only served the
poorest groups while most other people purchased private insurance than if
most people used the public plan and only the richest people bought private
insurance.256 Daniels argues that this is because under the former system, but
not the latter, the poor might justifiably complain that they are being denied
the medical resources that are necessary to achieve the range of normal
opportunities that are available to most people.257
The Right to a Decent Minimum
By contrast, the Right to a Decent Minimum is compatible with private
health insurance as long as it does not undermine access to a decent minimum
of health care.258 Since the various accounts of the Right to a Decent

251. Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 126, at 51.
252. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 79 (“[T]he fair equality of opportunity
account shares with the market approach the view that health-care services have a variety of
functions, only some of which may give rise to social obligations to provide them.”).
253. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 251.
254. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
255. Daniels, Justice and Access to Health Care, supra note 126, at 52.
256. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 259.
257. Norman Daniels, Is the Oregon Rationing Plan Fair?, 265 JAMA 2232, 2234 (1991). It is
not obvious that this second constraint is distinct from the first that Daniels articulates. It would
seem that if the basic tier were so barebones that only the poorest groups availed themselves of it,
then it would fail to protect normal functioning as much as possible under reasonable resource
constraints.
258. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 118, at 58 (“Granted that individuals are allowed to spend
their after-tax incomes on more frivolous items, why shouldn’t they be allowed to spend it on health?
If the answer is that they should be so allowed, as long as this does not interfere with the provision
of an adequate package of health-care services for everyone, then we have retreated . . . to
something very like the principle of a decent minimum.”); Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of
Health Care, supra note 13, at 890 (specifying that under the prudent insurance ideal, “people would
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Minimum do not view health care as special, they regard it as arbitrary to
prohibit wealthy individuals from purchasing better access to health care,
while at the same time allowing them to purchase fancier cars and houses.259
While the Right to a Decent Minimum is generally compatible with a
tiered health care system, the prudent insurance ideal and the modified
market account support allowing people to enroll in private insurance for
somewhat different reasons. The prudent insurance ideal does so since it
supports a distribution of health care resources that reflects what people
would choose for themselves under “fair free-market conditions.”260
Allowing some people to purchase more generous coverage if they wish is
consistent with Dworkin’s conception of equality, which is “sensitive to
people’s differing convictions about how to live.”261
By comparison, the modified market account supports tiering on the
basis that it leads to greater efficiency gains than establishing a single “onesize-fits-all” public plan.262 Economists Mark Shepard, Katherine Baicker,
and Jonathan Skinner show that these efficiency gains have actually grown
over time for three main reasons: rising income inequality has led to greater
divergence between the health care preferences of the rich and the poor;
expensive medical technology is increasingly crowding out other important
social goods; and the requisite tax financing has become prohibitively
costly.263 Moreover, although allowing tiering would lead to greater
inequalities in access to health care, Shepard, Baicker, and Skinner point out
that these inequalities can be offset by using the savings from a less generous
health care program to provide progressive cash transfers.264 Similar to
Dworkin, they point out that low-income people may prefer having less
generous health insurance coverage if it means they have more resources to
spend on other goods and services such as housing, education, and
transportation.265
B. Comparisons with Medicare for All and Incremental Reforms
In this Section, I compare the theoretical implications of the two
conceptions of the right to health care described above with the approaches
be free to negotiate specialized insurance in addition to [the] basic insurance package”) (emphasis
omitted).
259. Gutmann, supra note 178, at 545, 553.
260. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 22, at 317.
261. Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, supra note 13, at 898.
262. Shepard et al., supra note 181, at 1; see also DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE, supra note 3,
at 79 (suggesting that the modified market view is not only compatible with supplemental private
insurance, but in fact requires it).
263. Shepard et al., supra note 181, at 1.
264. Id. at 15.
265. Id.
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actually taken by Medicare for All and incremental proposals on these issues.
Exploring these comparisons reveals that Medicare for All is supported by
the Right to Equal Access in its approach to private insurance and costsharing, whereas the incremental plans are supported by the approach of the
Right to a Decent Minimum. Yet it also reveals that Medicare for All’s
approach is even more restrictive than necessary to conform to the Right to
Equal Access. Moreover, it shows that both sets of reforms fall short of both
theoretical conceptions of the right to health care in one important respect:
failing to place reasonable limits on health care spending.
1. Covered Benefits
As described above, both theoretical conceptions of the right to health
care require placing reasonable limits on health care spending in order to
avoid the bottomless pit objection. Yet even if one settles on a particular
conception of the right to health care, determining which benefits should be
guaranteed to all and which ones should not is challenging, to say the least.266
Decisions to limit health care benefits must not only find a method of
weighing these benefits against other social goods, but also of deciding how
health care benefits should be aggregated across specific populations.267 This
raises difficult moral questions: For instance, should priority be given to
treating the worst-off patients, maximizing overall welfare, or to some more
intermediate position?268
Further compounding these challenges, the question of which benefits
should be covered—and which ones should not—is one of the most
politically controversial issues involved in health care reform. In the United
States, the notion of government “rationing” of health care has long been a
bugaboo, so much so that even the slightest hint of limits on health care
benefits is viewed as politically toxic.269 Perhaps the most famous example
of this toxicity occurred when former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin
mischaracterized an innocuous ACA provision that merely enabled Medicare
266. See Gutmann, supra note 178, at 556–57 (“We need to find some principle or procedure by
which to draw a line at an appropriate level of access to health care short of what is socially and
technologically possible, but greater than what an unconstrained market would afford to most
people, particularly to the least advantaged. I suspect that no philosophical argument can provide
us with a cogent principle by which we can draw a line within the enormous group of goods that
can improve health or extend the life prospects of individuals.”).
267. See generally F. M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY, VOL. 1: DEATH AND WHOM TO SAVE
FROM IT (1993).
268. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 105.
269. See Colleen M. Grogan & Adam Oliver, Is It Rationing if the Public Decides?, 38 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L., 1067, 1067 (2013) (“The term rationing has been bandied about so
frequently in polarized political settings in the United States that most of us on this side of the
Atlantic cringe when we hear the word. We cringe because the term is used as an opposition device
to any reform proposal no matter how big or small its intent or potential impact.”).
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to pay for doctors’ appointments to discuss end-of-life issues with their
patients as a requirement to institute so-called “death panels.”270
In light of these philosophical and political challenges, it is small
wonder that the United States health care system largely fails to place
reasonable limits on covered spending.271 Currently, Medicare covers any
treatments that are deemed “reasonable and necessary,”272 which in practice
has been interpreted to exclude considerations of costs.273 Private insurers,
in turn, tend to follow Medicare’s lead in their coverage determinations.274
Although the ACA included several measures designed to incentivize highvalue care and promote comparative effectiveness research,275 it also placed
restrictions on the use of comparative effectiveness research or costeffectiveness analysis to inform coverage decisions.276
Neither Medicare for All nor the Biden plan would drastically alter this
state of affairs. At least in their current forms, both reform proposals shy
away from providing a specific procedure for placing limits on which
benefits will be covered. As described above, Medicare for All would
provide for coverage of a comprehensive set of benefits, including dental,

270. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13 NEV. L.J.
872, 873 (2013).
271. This may be starting to change, however. See Carl H. Coleman, Cost-Effectiveness Comes
to America: The Promise and Perils of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Medication Coverage
Decisions, 38 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25–35),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3813407 (describing how payers are
increasingly relying on cost-effectiveness criteria in making coverage determinations).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006).
273. Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101 GEO.
L.J. 519, 549–53 (2013). See also Nathan Cortez, Medicare for All: A Leap into the Known?, LAW
& POL. ECON. PROJECT (July 25, 2019), https://lpeproject.org/blog/medicare-for-all-a-leap-intothe-known/ (“Medicare . . . was designed to preserve physician autonomy and patient choice, not
make cost-effectiveness decisions.”).
274. NICHOLAS BAGLEY, AMITABH CHANDRA & AUSTIN FRAKT, HAMILTON PROJECT,
CORRECTING
SIGNALS
FOR
INNOVATION
IN
HEALTH
CARE
12
(2015),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/correcting_signals_for_innovation_in_health_care_b
agley.pdf.
275. See generally Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act: CRAMPing*
Our Health Care Appetite, 13 NEV. L.J. 822 (2013).
276. See Coleman, supra note 271, at 26–27; Richard S. Saver, Health Care Reform’s Wild
Card: The Uncertain Effectiveness of Comparative Effectiveness Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
2147, 2166–67 (2011); see also Govind Persad, Priority Setting, Cost-Effectiveness, and the
Affordable Care Act, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 129 (2015) (“The ACA does place substantial
limitations on the use of traditional cost-effectiveness analysis by certain actors in the healthcare
system, and also fails to remove the limitations that other laws—most notably the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)—may place on cost-effectiveness analysis, particularly on methods that
employ quality-adjusted life years (QALY) as a metric. But the ACA is not invariably hostile to
the use of cost-effectiveness or comparative effectiveness information, so long as these approaches
are employed without considering certain factors in a prohibited way.”).
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vision, hearing, and reproductive care.277 Moreover, it does not specify a
process for determining which services, drugs, and devices will be covered
within these categories and which will not.278 Instead, Medicare for All relies
on reducing health care costs by improving administrative efficiencies and
reducing provider payment rates.279 Yet there is substantial disagreement
concerning how much these provisions would reduce costs, in part because
the existing Medicare for All proposals do not specify how much providers
would be paid.280
Similarly, the Biden plan fails to place reasonable limits on covered
services. As described above, the Biden plan would introduce a public option
that would cover the ten categories of services listed in the ACA as “essential
health benefits” (EHBs).281 Yet these EHBs have not been defined in such a
way as to provide a process for setting reasonable limits on which specific
services will be covered.282 Instead, the Biden proposal suggests that it will
reduce health care costs in other ways, such as by using aggressive antitrust

277. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
278. See Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 134 (“Medicare for All would need a mechanism to
specify which services, drugs, and devices are covered within each benefit category.”).
279. Austin Frakt & Jonathan Oberlander, Challenges to Medicare for All Remain Daunting, 39
HEALTH AFFS. 142, 143 (2020). A different version of Medicare for All, introduced in the House
of Representatives by Rep. Jayapal, would also adopt a system of global budgeting to limit health
care costs—meaning that hospitals would be paid a fixed amount, prospectively, for all the services
they deliver over a year, based on negotiations between providers and regional directors. Medicare
for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. § 611 (2019).
280. See Frakt & Oberlander, supra note 279, at 143 (“Precisely how and on what schedule
Medicare for All would achieve cost savings through lower provider payments, as well as how large
those savings would be, is not clear.”); Katz et al., supra note 11.
281. Scott, supra note 62. Of note, although this Article focuses on the version of the Biden
health care plan described during his 2020 presidential campaign, the Biden Administration has
subsequently come out in favor of “improving access to dental, hearing, and vision coverage in
Medicare.” OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2022,
at 24 (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/budget_fy22.pdf. The
narrowing divide between the Biden approach and Medicare for All when it comes to covered
benefits provides further support for the notion that the Right to Equal Access does not necessarily
justify covering a broader set of health care benefits than the Right to a Decent Minimum. See
supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
282. See Amy B. Monahan, The Regulatory Failure to Define Essential Health Benefits, 44 AM.
J.L. & MED. 529, 561 (2018) (“The plans that serve as benchmarks in this process were all
developed in a regulatory system that did not take cost into account, that were subject to piecemeal
and ad hoc content regulation, and that were drafted by insurance companies who likely have very
different goals than lawmakers and regulators. In other words, there is no reason to believe that
these benchmark plans reflect societal priorities or values, or that they even result from a thoughtful,
deliberative process.”). The Department of Health and Human Services, which has authority for
further defining EHBs, considered using a process-based approach to refine the contents of EHBs,
but it ultimately opted to define EHBs by having the states designate an existing insurance plan in
the state as “benchmark plan.” See Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and
the Affordable Care Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 441, 443–46 (2014).
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enforcement to improve competition and by testing “innovative solutions that
improve quality of care.”283
As a result, at least in their current forms, both Medicare for All and the
Biden plan fall short from the perspective of either theoretical conception of
the right to health care.284 Even if we assume that the reforms being
considered would substantially reduce wasteful spending (which is, to say
the least, an optimistic assumption),285 that would not obviate the need to set
reasonable limits on medical spending more generally.286 The high level of
health care spending in the United States has siphoned away government
funding from other important social goods and services, such as education
and infrastructure, and contributed to fewer jobs and lower wages for
workers.287 These costs are disproportionately borne by the poor.288 Any just
health care system must grapple with how to balance these kinds of costs
against the benefits provided by medical spending.
Thus, if Medicare for All or the incremental reform proposals are to
fully conform with either conception of the right to health care, they must
provide some mechanism for placing reasonable limits on covered benefits.
They could, for example, use a method in line with Daniels’ and Sabin’s
283. Health Care, supra note 5.
284. At least at first glance, the Biden plan would seemingly fall short of achieving either
conception of the right to health care in another respect as well, in that it would leave a small
percentage of Americans uninsured. See supra note 65. That being said, some estimates suggest
that most or all of the remaining uninsured would be undocumented immigrants, and there are a
range of normative views about what kinds of legal rights this population is owed. See Blumberg,
supra note 65, at 12. See generally Joseph H. Carens, The Rights of Irregular Migrants, 22 ETHICS
& INT’L AFFAIRS 163 (2008) (describing the different positions on this issue and arguing that
undocumented immigrants deserve a range of legal rights). Although the accounts described in this
Article do not, to my knowledge, directly address this issue, it is by no means obvious that the Right
to a Decent Minimum would be less likely to support health care benefits for undocumented
immigrants than the Right to Equal Access. Thus, to the extent that the Biden plan (or other
incremental plans) would fail to cover this population, it does not appear to be because of some
characteristic of the Right to a Decent Minimum.
285. See Baicker & Chandra, supra note 202, at 607 (“Promises of reforms that will both reduce
spending and improve outcomes are popular to make, but evidence (and Congressional Budget
Office scoring) suggests that they’re difficult to keep.”); Amy Finkelstein, Why It’s So Hard to Cut
Waste
in
Health
Care,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
22,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/business/why-its-so-hard-to-cut-waste-in-health-care.html
(arguing that there is no “simple, miracle cure for excising most unnecessary medical care”).
286. See DANIELS, JUST HEALTH, supra note 17, at 105 (“The fact of nonideal conditions in any
system – inefficiency, profit taking at the expense of meeting needs, lack of universal coverage –
does not exempt us from the task of learning how to set limits fairly.”); see also Sreenivasan, Why
Justice Requires Rationing in Health Care, supra note 203, at 150–51 (responding to the objection
that the presence of waste in the health care system renders it unnecessary to ration medically
necessary spending).
287. See, e.g., ANNE CASE & ANGUS DEATON, DEATHS OF DESPAIR AND THE FUTURE OF
CAPITALISM 191–211 (2020); Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Labor Market Effects of
Rising Health Insurance Premiums, 24 J. LABOR ECON. 609 (2006).
288. CASE & DEATON, supra note 287.
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“accountability for reasonableness” process, or some kind of costeffectiveness or comparative effectiveness approach. Each of these
approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages, which are beyond the
scope of this Article to explore in more depth. My point is only that some
reasonable limits are necessary, and that without any such limits, these plans
both fall short from the perspective of either theoretical conception of the
right to health care.
2. Cost-Sharing
The Right to Equal Access helps to justify what might otherwise seem
like a puzzling feature of Medicare for All: namely, why it would nearly
completely eliminate cost-sharing. This is not a necessary or inevitable
feature of a single-payer health care system. Although some countries’
single-payer systems do place substantial limits on cost-sharing, others, such
as Sweden and Taiwan, impose cost-sharing on most health care services.289
So why does Medicare for All prohibit virtually all cost-sharing?
If one understands Medicare for All through the perspective of the Right
to Equal Access, then restricting cost-sharing is indeed necessary. Costsharing represents a financial barrier to accessing health care, which
disproportionately burdens the poor and the sick.290 By nearly eliminating
cost-sharing, Medicare for All helps to ensure that access to care is based
primarily on people’s relative need for health care, rather than on their ability
to pay.291 Thus, Medicare for All’s stringent approach to cost-sharing would
eliminate one important source of inequality in access to health care.
By the same token, the Right to a Decent Minimum helps to justify the
incremental reform proposals’ failure to eliminate cost-sharing. The Right to
a Decent Minimum does not require equality in access to health care services,
but rather only support ensuring some level of access to a decent minimum
of health care services. Thus, it is compatible with requiring people to pay
some amount of out-of-pocket costs when they see a health care provider,
even if doing so contributes to inequities in health care access. That being
said, presumably even the Right to a Decent Minimum would place some
outer limits on cost-sharing: If the cost-sharing requirements are sufficiently
onerous, then there becomes a point at which insurance coverage fails to
provide access to the decent minimum. To address this problem, some
market-oriented health scholars have endorsed “Value-Based Insurance

289. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 72, at 12.
290. See supra notes 226–233 and accompanying text.
291. Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 136.
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Design,” which “aligns patients’ out-of-pocket costs with the value of
services.”292
Yet, while Medicare for All’s approach to cost-sharing aligns more
closely with that of the Right to Equal Access, it takes a more stringent
approach than necessary to satisfy this ideal. Although both variants of the
Right to Equal Access would greatly restrict cost-sharing, only the insulation
ideal would necessarily eliminate cost-sharing for all types of services. As
discussed above, the fair equality of opportunity account in particular appears
to be compatible with imposing cost-sharing requirements on those services
that fall outside of the “basic tier.”293 Thus, Medicare for All could satisfy
this latter account of the Right to Equal Access while preserving a more
limited role for cost-sharing.
3. Private Insurance
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Medicare for All is that it
would significantly restrict—if not completely eliminate—private health
insurance. Medicare for All would prohibit duplicative insurance and
effectively eliminate nearly all forms of supplemental insurance and
complementary insurance. This would represent a radical transformation of
the existing health care system, which relies heavily on private insurance
companies not only to offer insurance coverage but also to administer
benefits under public programs, including Medicare and Medicaid.294
Again, this feature of Medicare for All is difficult to understand if one
thinks of Medicare for All simply as a single-payer health care system.
Indeed, many countries that have single-payer health care systems, including
Canada and the United Kingdom, allow supplemental private insurance and
other forms of private insurance.295 So why does Medicare for All take such
a restrictive approach with private insurance? Again, the Right to Equal
Access offers a clear answer to this question: Private health insurance is
restricted because it contributes to inequalities in access to health care.
Private health insurance contributes to inequalities in access by creating
different tiers of access to care, and potentially also by undermining access
to the benefits provided in the public plan.296
292. See Richardson et al., supra note 240.
293. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
294. See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 45, at 421; Reed Abelson & Margot Sanger-Katz,
Medicare for All Would Abolish Private Insurance. ‘There’s No Precedent in American History.’,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/health/private-healthinsurance-medicare-for-all-bernie-sanders.html.
295. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 72, at 13.
296. See supra notes 241–247 and accompanying text. Notably, even a strict one-tier system
would not ensure complete equality in access to care. For instance, people of color would still face
racial discrimination when seeking care and low-income people would still find it harder to take off

2021]

EQUALITY AND SUFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE REFORM

197

That being said, in its strict approach to private insurance, Medicare for
All seems to align more closely with the insulation ideal than with the fair
equality of opportunity account. Like the insulation ideal, Medicare for All
would create a strict one-tier system—but one so generous that it is designed
to ensure that wealthy people would have little reason to purchase private
insurance coverage, even if they were allowed to do so.
Having a one-tier system improves equality in access but creates an
uncomfortable dilemma. As discussed above, the current version of
Medicare for All is vulnerable to the bottomless pit objection since it fails to
place reasonable limits on covered spending.297 However, if Medicare for
All were to address this objection by adopting reasonable limits—while
maintaining a strict one-tier system—then it would be vulnerable to the
leveling down objection. Wealthier people would largely be prevented from
purchasing better access to health care, even though doing so would only
serve to make them worse off and not to make anyone else better off.298 There
would also likely be practical difficulties associated with such “leveling
down”: For instance, wealthier people might resort to shadow markets or
medical tourism to obtain access to health care not covered under the public
plan.299
The fair equality of opportunity principle shows that the Right to Equal
Access is compatible with a more permissive approach to private health
insurance. As long as the public plan still provides universal and equal
access, based on health needs, to the subset of health care services that
promote fair equality of opportunity under reasonable resource constraints
work to attend doctors’ appointments or find transportation to these appointments. See supra notes
50–59 and accompanying text. See also Segall, supra note 106, at 344 (“It is often acknowledged,
for example, that even a free and universal health care service is still more accessible to the rich
than it is to the poor.”).
297. See supra notes 277–280 and accompanying text.
298. Buchanan, supra note 118, at 58 (“[T]he strong equal access principle . . . forces us to
choose between two unpalatable alternatives. We can either set the publicly guaranteed level of
health care lower than the level that is technically possible or we can set it as high as is technically
possible. In the former case, we shall be committed to the uncomfortable conclusion that no matter
how many resources have been expended to guarantee equal access to that level, individuals are
forbidden to spend any of their resources for services not available to all. . . . If, on the other hand,
we set the level of services guaranteed for all so high as to eliminate the problem of persons seeking
extra care beyond this level, this would produce a huge drain on total resources, foreclosing
opportunities for producing important goods other than health care.”).
299. Jonathan Foley, Taking Medicare for All Seriously, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (June 11, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190606.959973/full/; Krohmal & Emanuel,
supra note 241, at 436. The phenomenon of medical tourism raises other important ethical concerns,
including that it will impede access to health care in so-called “destination” countries: countries to
which patients travel for medical treatment. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access
to Health Care, and Global Justice, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011) (specifying certain conditions under
which medical tourism may reduce access to care in destination countries, and examining the
accompanying moral obligations of “home” countries and international bodies).
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(and as long as the structure of inequality that results is not objectionable),
then the fair equality of opportunity account is compatible with some amount
of tiering.300 Therefore, instead of completely prohibiting duplicative
insurance, Medicare for All could impose requirements designed to bolster
the public plan—for instance, by imposing requirements that make private
duplicative insurance more expensive or less attractive to providers.301 Such
a middle-ground approach would make access to health care less equal than
under a strict one-tier system, but would still limit inequality in access to
those services that promote fair equality of opportunity and would be less
vulnerable to the leveling down and bottomless pit objections.
Whereas Medicare for All would prohibit most forms of private health
insurance coverage, the incremental health care reform proposals would
preserve private health insurance. The Biden plan, for example, would
increase both private and public coverage by expanding the subsidies on the
ACA exchanges, creating a new public option, and lowering the eligibility
age for Medicare.302 This more permissive approach to private insurance
avoids both the leveling down objection and the bottomless pit objection,
since the government can place reasonable limits on the public scheme
without preventing those who would prefer greater access to health care from
seeking it. At the same time, however, this approach will lead to relatively
greater inequalities in access to health care, as wealthier people will tend to
opt for more generous private coverage. Furthermore, even the Right to a
Decent Minimum requires imposing some basic restrictions on private health
insurance to ensure that it does not undermine public access to the contents
of the basic minimum. However, as long as adequate access to the contents
of the basic minimum is preserved, this conception of the right to health care
would not object to private coverage.
C. Divisions and Areas of Convergence
Examining the two conceptions of the right to health care shows that the
debate over the future of health care reform is at once deeper and narrower
than it is often understood to be.
This exercise clarifies what is at stake in the debate over health care
reform: not just concerns about political feasibility or economic impacts, but
also different moral or political values. Whether the access problem in
American health care is viewed as one of inadequate access or one of unequal
access leads to different conclusions about what kind of health care reform is
normatively desirable.
300. See supra notes 251–257 and accompanying text.
301. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 72, at 13.
302. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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The Right to a Decent Minimum implies that the goal of health care
reform should be to fill in the gaps in our current system so as to provide
access to a decent minimum of care for those who currently lack such access.
Under this conception of the right to health care, if everyone has access to
the decent minimum, it is not morally objectionable that some people have
greater access than others. Securing the right to health care does not,
therefore, require radically restricting cost-sharing or private health
insurance, as long as the structures of cost-sharing and private health
insurance do not impede access to the decent minimum.
By contrast, the Right to Equal Access implies that ensuring access to a
decent minimum may be a good start, but that it is insufficient to secure the
right to health care. Rather, it entails that at least some forms of inequalities
in access to health care are morally objectionable (such as those that impede
fair equality of opportunity), and that it is necessary to reduce these
inequalities. This requires restricting private health insurance and costsharing so that Americans do not experience significantly different levels of
access to the same basic sets of services depending on the particular source
of their insurance coverage.
To some extent, of course, the goals of ensuring adequate access and
more equal access may converge.303 Many of the same factors that impede
adequate access to care (such as the lack of insurance coverage and excessive
cost-sharing requirements) also contribute to inequalities in access to care.304
Therefore, incremental reforms that are aimed at ensuring that everyone has
access to adequate care—such as those embodied in the Affordable Care
Act—will also tend to reduce inequality in access to health care.305 The
overlap is not perfect; some reforms, such as restricting private supplemental
insurance coverage or ensuring that everyone has access to exactly the same
set of benefits, would improve equality in access but are not necessary to

303. See MOYN, supra note 21, at 60 (describing how in the mid-twentieth century, “the thinking
of the period” was that “the demand for a floor of sufficiency harmonized with a desire for a ceiling
on inequality—or the floor was placed so high that any contrast between the one and the other made
little sense”).
304. See supra Tbl. 1 and accompanying text.
305. See Sara Rosenbaum, Toward Equality and the Right to Health Care, in THE TRILLION
DOLLAR REVOLUTION, supra note 32, at 311, 313 (“Despite its failings, the ACA has achieved
dramatic, measurable gains in health equality, opening greater access for previously uninsured
Americans who, after all, were disproportionately low income and underserved.”). See also James
W. Nickel, Moral Grounds for Economic and Social Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON
ECONOMIC
AND
SOCIAL
RIGHTS
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
19),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3831503 (“[C]reating a floor of income and
services significantly reduces economic inequality. It does this, first, by pulling up everyone below
that income floor so that the lowest are not so low. And, second, when taxation is used to cover the
costs of providing the floor, this usually transfers significant amounts of income and wealth from
the top and middle to the bottom.”).
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ensure that all Americans have adequate access to care.306 Taken to an
extreme, reforms aimed at ensuring the Right to Equal Access could even
jeopardize the Right to a Decent Minimum if they resulted in significantly
leveling down access to health care. At the very least, though, these two
goals are not mutually exclusive. Why not then just pursue whatever health
care reforms would both reduce inequality in access and ensure adequate
access to care?
The problem is that there are practical tradeoffs in pursuing either one
of these conceptions of the right to health care. Any political capital and
resources that policymakers and advocates devote to implementing reforms
that reduce inequality in access to health care (such as placing restrictions on
private insurance coverage) constitute forgone political capital and resources
that could have been used to implement reforms to ensure that more
Americans have access to adequate care (for example, by expanding ACA
subsidies for individuals purchasing their own health insurance).307 They
also take capital and resources away from advocating for other policy
priorities that have nothing to do with health care (such as reforms aimed at
protecting voting rights or confronting climate change). These tradeoffs may
be worthwhile from the perspective of the Right to Equal Access, which
places special moral importance on distributing access to health care more
equally, but they are difficult to justify from the perspective of the Right to a
Decent Minimum, which does not view health care as morally distinctive.308
Likewise, even though incremental reforms that are aimed at addressing
the Right to a Decent Minimum (such as those in the Biden plan) would also
improve equality in access, they inevitably take capital and resources away
from more fundamental reforms that would do more to improve equality in
access to health care (such as Medicare for All). In fact, reforms that build
on the existing fragmented health care financing system might actually make

306. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
307. For an analogous point about whether the goal of tax law should be to reduce poverty or
inequality, see David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not Inequality: What Changes in the Tax System
Can Achieve, 66 TAX L. REV. 593, 639 (2013) (“My argument here is premised on there being tradeoffs; devoting political capital to one of these goals could limit the ability to achieve the other—
especially in tax negotiations (such as over fundamental reform) where both issues could very well
be on the table.”).
308. Shepard et al., supra note 181, at 15 (“This is the paradox of the egalitarian motive to
provide equitable access to health care; while leveling the health care playing field, it comes at the
opportunity cost of forgoing other public assistance that the poor and middle class might prefer.”);
see also Zachary Liscow, Redistribution for Realists, 107 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 45), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3792122 (noting that “lower-income
individuals . . . may not value [access to the best-available health care] at nearly the amount that it
costs to provide and would prefer to receive those resources in other forms where redistribution is
not as high”).
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a single-payer system more difficult to achieve in the long-run by
undercutting its political momentum.309
At the same time, however, this exercise reveals that there are surprising
areas of convergence between these two theoretical conceptions of the right
to health care, and accordingly, that there is room for greater convergence
between Medicare for All and the incremental proposals. This stems from
the conclusion that, like the Right to a Decent Minimum, the Right to Equal
Access does not require equal access to all forms of health care services.
In particular, with regard to the two policy issues on which the two
conceptions of the right to health care diverge the most—restricting private
health insurance and cost-sharing—the two conceptions are not as far apart
as it might seem. The Right to Equal Access does not necessarily require
prohibiting private health insurance and cost-sharing altogether. As
described above, fair equality of opportunity supports restricting some forms
of inequality in access to health care, yet it does not go so far as to necessitate
a one-tier system or the complete elimination of cost-sharing.310 Thus, with
respect to these two issues, Medicare for All takes a more stringent approach
than necessary to satisfy the Right to Equal Access. This implies that there
is room for amending Medicare for All to cover a narrower set of services
and to allow cost-sharing and private health insurance outside of those sets
of services.
As described above, there are other possible accounts besides the four
described in Part II that support the Right to Equal Access and the Right to a
Decent Minimum.311 It is possible that these other accounts might in turn
have somewhat different implications. For instance, perhaps accounts that
place greater emphasis on equal capabilities, equal efforts to relieve pain, or
equal respect would justify Medicare for All’s more stringent approach to
cost-sharing and private health insurance. Yet it is not obvious that is the
case, or if so, how such accounts would navigate between the bottomless pit
objection and the leveling down objection.
Furthermore, any tenable version of the Right to Equal Access or the
Right to a Decent Minimum must place reasonable limits on what kinds of
services are covered. The fair equality of opportunity account implies one
way to set such limits: covering those services that are necessary for
maintaining or restoring normal functioning.312 The modified market
309. See Jacob S. Hacker, From the ACA to Medicare for All?, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR
REVOLUTION, supra note 32, at 333, 344 (“[A] big problem with most partway proposals is that
they seem poorly suited to create strong momentum to go all the way to universal coverage and
systemwide price regulation. Indeed, they may actively work against going all the way by leaving
out the least sympathetic groups . . . .”).
310. See supra notes 251–257 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 187–198 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 121–129 and accompanying text.
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account and prudent insurance ideal suggest different approaches to
determining such limits.313 In their current forms, both Medicare for All and
the Biden plan fall short from the perspective of both conceptions of the right
to health care by failing to place any reasonable limits on health care
spending. Thus, both categories of reform plans have more work to do if
their aim is to provide a just distribution of health care.
CONCLUSION
This Article helps bring to light the moral dimensions of the debate over
health care reform. Simply declaring that health care is a right does not
predetermine what kind of legal entitlement to health care there should be.
The two predominant approaches to health care reform in the United States—
the incremental approach of building on the current fragmented health care
financing system, and the more radical approach of wiping the slate clean and
enacting Medicare for All—are supported by two different conceptions of
what the right to health care entails. The former is supported by the notion
that the right to health care requires only access to a decent minimum of
health care services, while the latter is supported by the idea that the right to
health care requires some degree of equality in access.
The public debate over health care reform frequently fails to distinguish
between these two conceptions of the right to health care. To be sure, some
supporters of Medicare for All argue that it is morally distinctive because of
its emphasis on reducing inequality.314 Yet it is often not clear from their
arguments why inequality in access to health care (as opposed to inadequate
access) is objectionable, and whether these objections extend to all forms of
inequality in access. Incrementalists, on the other hand, have tended to not
even respond to the moral case for Medicare for All. Instead, they have
tended to argue that it is politically infeasible or excessively costly, or deny
that there are any salient moral differences between Medicare for All and
incremental reforms.315
Greater understanding of the moral values at stake in health care reform
is important since it may affect policymakers’ and voters’ judgments about
what kind of reform is desirable. These effects could play out in various
ways. On the one hand, greater awareness of Medicare for All’s emphasis
on reducing inequality in health care could, over time, help to build public
support for a single-payer health care system (as some Medicare for All

313. See supra notes 214–225 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
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advocates appear to assume will be the case).316 Indeed, many Americans
support the notion that everyone should be treated equally in the health care
system.317 Thus, perhaps even those who are skeptical of Medicare for All’s
feasibility or economic impacts may find its emphasis on equal access
appealing, if they are made aware of that emphasis. On the other hand, the
opposite could happen: By more explicitly engaging with the moral case for
Medicare for All, incrementalists could convince more Americans that the
real problem is a lack of adequate access, not inequality in access per se, and
thus that an incremental approach to health care reform is preferable.318
Alternatively, greater understanding of these divergent moral values
could lead to increased support for some middle-ground approach, one that
incorporates elements of both the Right to Equal Access and the Right to a
Decent Minimum. For instance, greater understanding of these divergent
moral values could result in greater support for a health care reform that does
not immediately abolish the current fragmented health care financing system,
but which instead incorporates more targeted reforms that are designed to
make this system more equal, not just to ensure that everyone has access to
the decent minimum.319 Or instead, it could lead to greater support for a
similarly ambitious egalitarian health care reform agenda as Medicare for
All, but one which better reconciles the demand for equal access to health
care with the necessity of reasonable limits.
Of course, Americans can—and should—take non-moral
considerations, such as political feasibility, into account when deciding how
to reform the health care system. Yet they must also consider a more basic
question, one that underlies the purpose of reforming the health care system

316. See, e.g., Adam Gaffney, Single-Payer Won’t Pass Now. But Its Popularity Proves Our
Morals
Are
Changing,
WASH.
POST.
(Sept.
13,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/09/13/single-payer-wont-passnow-but-its-popularity-proves-our-morals-are-changing/. See also James A. Morone, How to Think
about “Medicare for All”, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2209, 2209 (2017) (describing Medicare for All
as “an exercise in moral persuasion,” and writing that Medicare for All “responds with a strong
claim for a right to roughly equal health coverage for everyone”).
317. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, N.Y. TIMES & HARV. T.H. CHAN SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH,
AMERICANS’ VALUES AND BELIEFS ABOUT NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM 10 (2019),
https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/94/2019/10/CMWF-NYT-Harvard_FinalReport_Oct2019.pdf (finding that 77% of polled American adults believe that equal treatment in
health care is very important).
318. Harry Frankfurt makes an analogous argument in the context of the debate over economic
inequality, arguing that while economic inequality strikes many people as wrong, what really
underlies their intuition is a distaste for poverty, not economic inequality per se. See FRANKFURT,
supra note 20, at 40–41.
319. For one proposal along these lines, see Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Health Reform
Reconstruction,
55
UC
DAVIS
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3760086 (advocating a strategy of
“confrontational incrementalism”).
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in the first place: What kind of health care do we owe to one another?
Acknowledging the two conceptions of the right to health care described in
this Article is a necessary step in answering that question.

